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This Master’s thesis examines the effect of European Union’s (EU) human rights practice on 
the external perceptions of the EU. More specifically, it focuses on the consistency between 
EU human rights rhetoric and practice and explores how the possible inconsistencies affect 
the external image of the Union as a normative model on human rights. Previous research on 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) and external perceptions of the EU has shown that there are 
specific expectations to the foreign policy conduct of a normative actor. However, it has also 
been highlighted that the importance of a link between normative power and external 
perceptions has been underestimated in the literature thus far. Therefore, the thesis aims to 
investigate this link by focusing on the example of EU human rights consistency in its 
treatment of refugees and other migrants throughout its hotspot approach and to explore the 
effects of the human rights consistency on the external perceptions of the Union in regard of 
being a normative model on human rights and migration. To study this, the thesis first 
examines the human rights rhetoric of the EU and compares it to the human rights practice 
in the hotspot first reception facilities of migrants in Italy and Greece. The study then moves 
on to investigate the external perceptions of the EU as a normative actor on human rights and 
migration in Turkey and Jordan based on the statements of political elite and interviews with 
representatives of the civil society. The findings show that there are various inconsistencies 
between the EU’s rhetoric and practice in terms of human rights in the hotspots. Furthermore, 
these inconsistencies have negatively affected the external perceptions of the EU as a model 
on human rights and migration in Turkey and Jordan. Additionally, the study reveals that the 
external perceptions of the EU as a human rights protector in the world have suffered since 
2015 as a response to the poor treatment of refugees within the territory of the Union. 
Keywords: European Union, Normative Power Europe, external perceptions, human rights 
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Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 4 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 5 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6 
1. Theoretical framework: Normative Power and the External Perceptions of the 
EU ............................................................................................................................. 10 
1.1.Normative Power Europe .......................................................................................... 10 
1.2.External perceptions of the European Union ............................................................ 22 
2. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 31 
2.1.Case selection and research design ........................................................................... 31 
2.2.Research methods used in the thesis ......................................................................... 35 
3. European Union Human Rights Rhetoric and Practice ...................................... 39 
3.1.European Union human rights rhetoric ..................................................................... 39 
3.2.‘Hotspots’ – the first reception facilities in Greece and Italy ................................... 41 
3.3.European Union human rights practice in the hotspots ............................................ 49 
3.4.Discussion ................................................................................................................. 57 
4. External Perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan ....................................... 59 
4.1.Elite perceptions of the EU as a human rights model in the context of the treatment 
of migrants ................................................................................................................ 59 
4.1.1. Turkey ................................................................................................................. 59 
4.1.2. Jordan .................................................................................................................. 65 
4.2.Civil society perceptions of the EU as a human rights model in the context of the 
treatment of migrants ................................................................................................ 69 
4.2.1. Turkey ................................................................................................................. 70 
4.2.2. Jordan .................................................................................................................. 75 
4.3.Discussion ................................................................................................................. 81 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 84 
References ............................................................................................................................ 90 
Primary sources – leaders’ speeches, statements and interviews ...................................... 90 
Secondary sources ............................................................................................................. 96 
Annex 1 ............................................................................................................................... 104 
Annex 2 ............................................................................................................................... 105 
Annex 3 ............................................................................................................................... 106 
 
Acknowledgements 
The author of the thesis thanks the supervisors for providing valuable feedback and offering 
assistance throughout the writing process. Additionally, the author thanks the interviewees 
for contributing to the making of the thesis and to all the people who were of help with finding 
the suitable interviewees for the collection of data. 
 
List of Abbreviations 
CFREU - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
EASO – European Asylum Support Office 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights 
ECRE – European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
EEAS – European External Action Service 
EPL – External Perceptions Literature 
EU – European Union 
EURTF – European Union Regional Task Force 
FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
IOM – International Organization for Migration 
IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Networks 
MDSD – Most different systems design 
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières 
NGO – Non-governmental organization 
NPE – Normative Power Europe 
TEU – Treaty on European Union 
UNCRC - United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 




The topic of the present study is the effect of the EU human rights practices on the external 
perceptions of the EU. More specifically, the research aims to explain the effects that the 
consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and human rights practice with respect to the 
treatment of refugees and migrants has on the external perceptions of the EU as a normative 
model. The study focuses on the external perceptions of the EU as a normative model in 
human rights protection and migration in Turkey and Jordan, two of the major refugee 
hosting countries on the most populated – Eastern Mediterranean migratory route towards 
the EU. The research is limited to the time period of 2015 – 2020, from the peak of the 
European migrant crisis until the beginning of conducting the study in November 2020. 
It is important to study external perceptions of the EU because they play a significant part in 
the self-identification process of the EU as an international actor. By definition, roles are 
shaped by the role conception of an actor itself, the expectations of other actors and the 
socially prescribed roles which are a result of international negotiations among actors (Holsti, 
1970; Elgström & Smith, 2006; Harnisch, 2011; Elgström & Chaban. 2015). It is worth 
noting that the outsiders tend to have quite unshakable views on what kind of role(s) the EU 
should hold in various contexts. This means that external perceptions of the EU seem to be 
rather stable and a change in EU human rights practice might not right away lead to change 
in the perceptions but instead occur with a delay. These views are shaped by previous 
experience; existing images of the EU which are to some extent also influenced by what the 
EU itself claims; and the normative expectations to the EU. The perceptions that the external 
actors have based on these conditions shape EU roles and the quality of its performance 
within these roles (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 20). Furthermore, any self-identification of 
the EU as a certain kind of power in the world only holds a meaning in case this identification 
is also shared by the outsiders (Tsuruoka, 2008: 5). 
Secondly, external perceptions have a direct effect on the effectiveness of EU policies abroad. 
How the rest of the world perceives the EU holds great importance when it comes to 
promoting or opposing the achievements of EU policies (Lucarelli, 2013). For example, 




an exceptional actor or even a normative power in the rest of the world (Elgström & Chaban, 
2015: 20). Reactions to EU’s policy initiatives are likely to be determined by how legitimate, 
coherent and credible they seem. Legitimacy refers to the assumption that what the actor is 
doing is appropriate, desirable and in compliance with certain socially constructed norms and 
values (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 21). The more legitimacy an actor has, the easier it will 
be for it to persuade other actors (Nye, 2007: 177). Similar to legitimacy, credibility as well 
is a subjective element. It is affected by the perceptions of the available resources, unity, and 
coherence. For the EU to be a model on human rights and migration, this means that unless 
the EU itself lives up to the commitments that it has taken upon by the treaties and other 
relevant laws and regulations, it is not likely to be taken seriously by other actors in this 
specific field. The final quality – coherence – means the consistency between the policies 
and actions, different institutions, and member states (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 22-23). 
These three factors are central to the topic of this thesis as it addresses the consistency 
between the EU human rights conversation and the actual practice within its borders, at the 
hotspot refugee camps. Based on the definitions above, the unwillingness of the EU to act in 
a manner it promises and also advertises abroad – in other words, inconsistently – negatively 
affects both its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the external actors, at least in the 
issue area of human rights, but as a domino effect possibly also in other areas. 
Additionally, previous studies have shown that while the EU is often perceived to carry 
normative features in association to human rights, the EU’s actions regarding human rights 
related to refugees have received negative observations and triggered doubts about the 
applicability of EU norms in that particular context (Barcevičius et al., 2015: 19). For this 
reason it is important to conduct more detailed case studies with respect to the EU human 
rights practice within its borders, such as in the hotspot refugee camps, and demonstrate its 
impact on the external perceptions of the Union and on the EU’s image as a normative model 
in the world. 
Several scholars (Elgström & Chaban, 2015; Chaban et al., 2013; Bengtsson & Elgström, 
2012) of external perceptions literature have suggested that the future studies in the field 
should increasingly focus on discourse-, location-, issue- and time-specific indicators in their 
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analyses because this will build a solid theoretical basis for the increasingly attractive study 
area of EU external perceptions. Systemic and distinct profile of EU external perceptions will 
not only carry high academic value, but also benefit the EU external action practitioners such 
as negotiators and diplomats working in the field (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 32-33). That is 
namely how this thesis focused on the external perceptions of the EU as a normative actor in 
the fields of human rights and migration within a specific region – Turkey and Jordan as 
representative countries of the nearby Middle-East – will contribute to the field of study of 
EU external perceptions. 
Taking all the above into account, the study explores the effect that the EU human rights 
practice has on how the EU is perceived abroad and whether it influences the image of the 
EU as a normative model on human rights. The research question of the thesis is the 
following: how does the consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and practice in the 
treatment of migrants affect the external perceptions of the EU as a normative model on 
human rights and migration? To answer the posed research question, the study forms the 
following hypothesis: Inconsistency between the EU human rights rhetoric and practice in 
the treatment of migrants and refugees negatively affects the external perceptions of the EU 
as a model on human rights protection and migration. In order to test this hypothesis, a 
comparative study focusing on Turkey and Jordan, which are both major refugee hosting 
states on the Eastern Mediterranean migratory route towards the EU, will be conducted.  
This thesis analyzes two European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) situation 
reports from the hotspot refugee first reception facilities in Italy and Greece to assess the EU 
human rights practice in the hotspots and compares it to the EU human rights rhetoric 
embedded in its treaties and regulations. To measure the effect of consistency between EU 
human rights rhetoric and practice on the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and 
Jordan, the study uses content analysis of political leaders’ speeches and data retrieved from 
nine semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives working with refugees, five from 
Turkey and four from Jordan. All of the interviewees have agreed to participate in the 
interviews under the condition of full anonymity to themselves and their organizations. 
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The thesis takes a narrow focus to the human rights practice related to the treatment of 
refugees and other migrants within the borders of the EU. Therefore, the external perceptions 
of the EU in Turkey and Jordan are also focused on the issue areas of human rights and 
migration only. The study will not assess the EU as a Normative Power in a general context. 
Instead it will examine specifically whether the EU is seen as a normative model on human 
rights and migration in the world. Additionally, the external perceptions of the EU as a 
normative actor on human rights and migration will be studied only in two Middle-Eastern 
countries – Turkey and Jordan. 
The thesis is broadly divided into three sections. The first section is the theoretical framework 
which the research is based on. The theoretical framework section explains the concept of 
normative power and introduces the phenomenon of Normative Power Europe (NPE) as well 
as discusses the EU external perceptions literature (EPL). The second section of the thesis is 
the methodology of the research. The methodology section explains the methodological 
framework used for the research, introduces the sources used for the data collection and 
discusses the case selection and research variables. The third section is the empirical section 
consisting of the analysis of the research findings. This section entails the analysis of the 
consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and practice and the analysis of the data on 
the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan, gathered from the leader’s speeches 










1. Theoretical framework: Normative Power and the External Perceptions 
of the EU 
To study the normative impact of EU human rights practice on the external perceptions of 
the EU, it is necessary to understand the essential arguments of both Normative Power 
literature and External Perceptions literature. In general terms, the concept of normative 
power refers to one’s ability to persuade the others’ understanding of what is normal and thus 
influence them to act in a particular way, in compliance with ‘the normal’. This concept is 
tightly related to external perceptions because the impressions of external actors ultimately 
decide whether another international actor is considered to be worth following or not. This 
chapter will outline the most important theoretical claims of Normative Power Europe and 
External Perceptions of the EU literature, emphasize their connecting points and create a 
theoretical framework of understanding for studying the effect of EU human rights practice 
on the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan. 
1.1. Normative Power Europe 
The existing literature on the EU in general entails a rich discussion on what kind of an 
international actor the EU is. One important aspect of this discussion is what kind of a power 
the EU is in the international arena. Normative Power Europe (NPE) is a concept that has 
been widely discussed and debated in the International Relations literature for the past two 
decades since Ian Manners wrote his seminal work on the phenomenon in 2002. Since then, 
the concept has been developed further, studied both theoretically and empirically in various 
contexts and based on various examples (e.g. Manners, 2002; Whitman, 2011; Pace, 2007), 
but also criticized by primarily realist scholars for the lack of regard for the ‘selfish’ interests 
of the large and powerful member states of the EU (e.g. Hyde-Price, 2006). The first section 
of the theoretical background of this thesis will introduce the basis of normative power 
Europe, how it is constructed and what are its shortcomings. The section on normative power 
Europe ends with the discussion of literature establishing the link between NPE and EU 
external perceptions, bringing together the two theoretical cornerstones of the given thesis. 
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The scholarly interest in the normative features of the EU is strongly based on the 
developments in European foreign policy cooperation and the specific emphasis on values 
and norms according to which the EU conducts its external relations. Those norms and 
principles are embedded in the foundational treaties of the Union and form the very identity 
of the EU, thus also shaping its role in the international arena as a foreign policy actor 
(Whitman, 2011: 2; Manners, 2002). In some of his first writings, Manners explained the 
need to introduce normative power Europe with the lack of normative theorizing in the 
literature, as well as the necessity to frame post-Cold War politics in a more principle-
oriented way since the EU had developed to emphasize the principles of democracy, rule of 
law and human rights (Manners, 2007a: 77; Whitman, 2011: 2). The basic idea of the 
normative power argument thus lies in rejecting the state-centered view that is common in 
previous traditional approaches and rather defining EU foreign policy in normative terms 
(Whitman, 2011: 3-4), working through ideas, opinions and conscience (Diez & Manners, 
2007: 175). Richard Whitman has argued in the introduction of his book on Normative Power 
Europe that “normative power focuses on ‘non-material exemplification found in the 
contagion of norms’ through imitation and representation of the EU which has become a pole 
of attraction” (Whitman, 2011: 4). What makes the EU a unique case and a perfect example 
of a normative power according to Manners, is the way it has positioned universal norms and 
principles at the center of its relations both with its member states and the rest of the world 
(Manners, 2006e: 176). Although these norms and principles are universal, the way the EU 
has internalized them into its policies and is pursuing them in its external relations, is 
extraordinary.  
EU normative basis 
Ian Manners argues that the EU’s normative power originates from three sources: historical 
context meaning the legacy of the two world wars; hybrid polity meaning that the EU consists 
of intergovernmental and supranational institutions and political-legal constitutionalism 
meaning that it is elite-driven and treaty-based. These features enabled to bring the common 
values and principles of the member states under the same framework (Manners, 2002: 240-
241). The two world wars pushed the members to strive for a peaceful Europe while the 
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hybrid polity guarantees that decisions are not only made by one member state nor only by 
supranational bodies, thus threatening the states’ sense of sovereignty. Political-legal 
constitutionalism sets for the EU to be led by politicians while clearly setting its agenda in 
the common legal framework. According to NPE literature, these principles define the EU in 
various policy areas where it places the norms such as peace, democracy, liberty, rule of law 
and human rights into the very center of its relations with the rest of the world and thus builds 
its power and legitimacy on these norms (Manners, 2002: 244). In his work, Manners has 
listed the norms that he bases the NPE argument on, dividing them into five ‘core’ norms and 
four ‘minor’ norms, all originating from the foundational treaties or general EU practices. 
The core norms are the most important norms that the Union is built on. These norms are 
peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The minor norms can be in a way considered to be supporting norms to the core 
ones and include social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good 
governance (Manners, 2002: 242-243). Manners further argues that “the reinforcement and 
expansion of the norms identified […] allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being 
more than the sum of its parts” (Manners, 2002: 244). This idea also gives a clear signal that 
the EU based on its values should have a great normative power. 
While the above listed norms are specific to the EU and aim to define its nature and set a way 
for its actions, normative power as such can be described as an actor who is able to define 
any kind of conceptions of normal and thus pave a way of behavior for the others. The 
normative power argument is strongly based on the actorness and capability of the EU in 
world politics in general (Whitman, 2011: 6). The ability to shape normality in world politics 
has clear practical implications since changing norms (which essentially has ideational 
implications) in the end leads to the introduction of new standards and regulations and the 
conception of appropriate action in the international arena (Manners, 2008b: 45). Ultimately 
then, normative power has two different aspects: being normative and acting in a normative 
way (Manners, 2008b: 45; Whitman, 2011: 6) meaning that while the first is directly related 
to the very nature of the actor, the latter relates to whether the actor behaves ethically 
according to the values or not. In his seminal work, Manners argued that the normative power 
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argument about Europe foremost focuses on what the EU is (Manners, 2002: 252). In her 
criticism for NPE, Lisbeth Aggestam however has proposed that while the EU’s influence 
and impact is becoming more and more important, there is a need to shift the focus on what 
the EU does rather than what it is (Aggestam, 2008: 4). This was in fact pointed out by Alston 
and Weiler already in 1999 when they argued that “the Union can only achieve the leadership 
role to which it aspires through the example it sets” (Alston & Weiler, 1999: 4-5). To 
conclude, when studying NPE, one should focus both on what makes the EU normative by 
its nature and how this normativity is visible from its behavior. 
However, the practice of normative power does not conclude with normative action merely 
but gets further transferred into impact. Whitman has pointed out that the study of NPE 
requires a thorough analysis of various impacts on different levels such as legal, individual 
and foremost the non-European level (Whitman, 2011: 7). In one of his later works, Manners 
discusses the normative basis of the EU in its external actions referring to procedural 
normative ethics. Based on this, the first step for the EU is to become a ‘virtuous example’ 
by applying its principles at home because the consistency between the actions at home and 
abroad proves the EU not to be hypocritical in its aspirations (Manners, 2008b: 55-56). 
Secondly, the procedural normative ethics relies on the degree of how the rules and 
regulations guiding the EU’s external actions are formalized. Furthermore, it suggests that 
rule-bounded governed behavior combined with public debate and forethought are crucial 
for sensible action in the international arena. Lastly and most importantly, normative ethics 
takes into consideration the impact of (EU’s) actions, assessing and valuating the specific 
outcomes and making sure that they are compliant with the pursued values and do not cause 
harm abroad (Manners, 2008b: 58-59).  
On the impact of normative actions, Erik Eriksen has argued that while the motives might be 
honorable, the polity’s normative quality is not fully representable by these motives, but 
might be rather arbitrary (Eriksen, 2006: 252). This means that while a policy might have 
good intentions, it might contradict the values and interests of others bringing us to some of 
the criticism towards the idea of NPE. Adrian Hyde-Price for example has criticized the idea 
of NPE arguing that instead of being an actor who stands uniquely for the universal norms 
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and values, the EU is really used by some of its most influential member states as a 
mechanism for exercising hegemonic power and shaping their geographic neighborhood 
according to their individual strategic and economic interests (Hyde-Price, 2006: 226-227). 
In his later work, he remarks ironically that the Europeans have been able to see through the 
Bush administration’s arguments that the ‘good’ defined by the United States is good for the 
whole world but fail to realize that similar claims of the EU are equally hypocritical and 
inconsiderate (Hyde-Price, 2008: 32). Yet, while the concept of normative power has a 
connotation that the particular norms are ‘good’, the study itself focuses rather on how these 
norms have spread around the world, not necessarily whether they are considered to be ‘good’ 
everywhere. 
Conclusively, the normative basis of the EU rests on its historical development process and 
motives and uniqueness in the international arena. The norms and principles that the EU has 
grown to protect and expand are embedded into the foundational treaties. Thus, by principle, 
the EU is not only responsible for the distribution of these norms, but foremost behaving 
according to these norms itself. Only then will the final step, studying the impact of the EU 
influence in the rest of the world, be possible.    
The construction of EU normative power 
The construction of EU normative power describes what the EU does in the international 
arena to knowingly pursue spreading particular norms and values. In her article, Michelle 
Pace has outlined six components of the construction of NPE built around what the EU 
considers as appropriate action (Pace, 2007: 1044). These components can also help to better 
understand how the EU is specifically constructing its human rights influence in the world. 
The first and perhaps the most vital component of NPE is the content (Pace, 2007: 1045) – 
the substance of what is being advertised and valued by the EU in the world. Pace argues that 
it can be understood as institutional expressions of the principles that the EU actors are 
promoting such as rule of law, governance, democracy, human rights, order and justice. In 
its relations with the other parties, the EU uses this content as a common reference point 
(Pace, 2007: 1045). The second component to understand is the process of NPE construction. 
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The EU has developed specific mechanisms for pursuing its normative power, including 
various agreements containing conditionality clauses, such as accession agreements and 
cooperation agreements. These processes can be best observed in developing and conflict-
prone regions, especially in European periphery where the EU is offering financial and 
humanitarian aid, often in exchange for meeting the conditions based on the very core values 
of the EU (Pace, 2007: 1046). Another important component of the NPE construction are the 
agents (Pace, 2007: 1049) – the institutions (and in certain contexts the member states) of the 
EU. The agents are responsible for constructing the NPE image in international settings. 
Here, different institutions have different roles to play. For example, the Council determines 
the major policy principles and general guidelines for foreign policy while the Commission 
is regarded as the main institution for ‘guiding’ the normative principles in their actions. The 
Parliament largely holds the role of leading discussions and is thus keeping the debates 
around the defining normative principle alive (Pace, 2007: 1047-1050). For the construction 
of NPEU in the international arena, it is crucial for the member states to follow and publicly 
stand for the EU norms and principles also in their individual endeavors to avoid external 
claims of hypocrisy and challenges to the EU’S international legitimacy (Pace, 2007: 1047-
1048). 
The fourth component of NPE is the environment. As the EU is an international community, 
it itself is the major environment is which the construction of NPE is framed. The fact that 
the core norms and principles are embedded in the domestic environment resonates in the 
international arena and gives the EU more legitimacy abroad (Pace, 2007: 1050). The fifth 
component are mechanisms – the ways in which the EU actors act upon the representation of 
the EU as a normative power. Broadly defined, this includes dialogues and other diplomatic 
instruments such as bilateral contracts or policy initiatives in areas related to the key 
normative principles of the EU such as human rights, border security, trade etc. (Pace, 2007: 
1051-1054). The last component of the NPE construction are the overarching goals of the 
EU indicated in the statements of the EU actors, highlighting the values, norms and ideas that 
the EU stands for and wishes to see in practice around the world. Through such 
pronouncements, the EU is contributing to the development of its international normative 
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image (Pace, 2007: 1054). It is worth mentioning here that even the EU itself has accepted 
the ‘normative power’ label and has used it in his official communication as well as shared 
topical materials of this field on their web pages (see e.g. European Council, 2019). 
As discussed above, the process of normative power turning into practice ultimately consists 
of three parts: the norms that the whole concept is based on – the very nature of the EU; the 
way in which the EU is trying to pursue these norms; and the outcome of these activities. The 
discussed components of the construction of normative power explain the second part of 
normative power turning into practice – the ways in which the EU is knowingly making an 
effort to expand its normative influence. When bringing these components to the context of 
EU normative influence on human rights, the content would be the way that the EU has 
integrated human rights into its legal documents – the treaties and is using these rights also 
as a reference point in its relations with the other countries. The processes include for 
example agreements including human rights clauses that the EU has with its partners, 
including Jordan which has an association agreement with the EU and Turkey which is an 
official candidate country to become a member state. The agents of the NPE construction are 
EU officials and institutions who through their interactions and agreements with Turkey and 
Jordan, are pursing the normative influence of the EU in these countries in terms of human 
rights. Environment is an important component because this entails the real human rights 
practice within the EU itself. Based on Pace’s assumptions, this would mean that the more 
the domestic environment in the EU protects human rights, the more likely it is to influence 
the situation in the partner states. The mechanisms in terms of human rights include the ways 
in which the EU is responding to the human rights issues and what kind of policies are being 
implemented to address the topic. As for the goals of normative influence on human rights, 
it means the articulated objectives of the Union that it wishes to see in other countries, 
including Turkey and Jordan. 
EU normative power and consistency 
Having now introduced the concept of normative power, the normative basis of NPE, and the 
important components of norm construction by the EU, it is necessary to take a step further 
and discover the literature more specifically focusing to the topic of this thesis. It is important 
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to establish a connection between NPE, more specifically the human rights promotion aspect 
of NPE, the human rights rhetoric of the Union and the real human rights practice taking 
place within the Member States to then be able to assess the impact on the external 
perceptions of the EU. 
As development aid and humanitarian assistance make up a significant part of EU external 
action, they are crucial to include when analyzing the international identity of the Union 
(Birchfield, 2011: 142). Although external aid and assistance programs are of main focus 
here, the assistance system in fact originates from the EU cohesion policies whereby the less 
wealthy and developed EU regions get more support from the structural funds of the Union 
(Birchfield, 2011: 143). This is important for the discussion of NPE not only because 
humanitarian and development aid helps promote and support values such as democracy, the 
protection of fundamental and human rights etc., but also because of the credibility of EU as 
a normative actor – not only promoting the norms externally, but also applying them at home. 
Thus, the external projection of norms and values emphasizing the humanitarian and civilian 
nature of the EU through the development aid projects is based on the example from within 
the EU itself (Birchfield, 2011: 149). Vicki Birchfield argues that while EU offering 
development assistance to other countries and regions is a textbook example of what the EU 
should be doing, it also clearly serves as a strategy of promoting its norms and values abroad 
(Birchfield, 2011: 150). This is important to the context of this thesis because the EU is also 
offering a significant amount of development aid for both human rights protection and 
refugee protection in Turkey and Jordan. Thus, it proves that the EU is through the promotion 
of human rights abroad also contributing to its rise as a normative model in the specific issue 
area in these countries. 
Based on the empirical research on the topic using data on EU foreign aid from 1990 to 2003, 
Birchfield has claimed that in majority of the areas the EU approach to development is 
consistent with its norms and values and proves to be efficient in terms of global poverty 
reduction, one of the EU goals driven by its core normative aspirations. Building on these 
findings, she has argued that the EU development policies represent both the normative form 
and the empirical function of the idea and praxis of NPE (Birchfield, 2011: 159). With the 
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allocation of funds and support to the countries which the EU is trying to influence and guide 
towards its ideals, it is laying the foundation for further change to take place. Thus, donating 
various types of aid to the third countries serves as one of the most important available 
mechanisms for the EU to constitute its normative power in the world. 
Hypocrisy? Normative power Europe and human rights. 
As indicated in previous paragraphs, the failure of the EU to act in line with its external 
normative promotions is highly likely to jeopardize its chances to be globally perceived as a 
normative power. Yet, the literature on the inconsistencies in the EU discourses and practice 
regarding human rights is gradually growing, pointing to the fact that the normative image 
of the EU in the international arena might be undermined.  
In his rather critical assessment of NPE and human rights protection, Mauro Gatti has argued 
that while the external promotion of human rights is one of the key elements defining the 
international identity of the EU, the latter lacks capabilities to also promote these rights 
internally. Thus, the EU is contributing to defining what is considered to be normal at the 
international level, but not as much within Europe itself (Gatti, 2016: 300). This has been an 
issue for example in the context of protecting national minority rights in which some of the 
EU member states do not have the cleanest track record in, although it is has even been an 
accession requirement to the EU since 1990 and is also embedded into the Copenhagen 
Criteria. Compliance with this criteria is among other laws being assessed based on the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, Belgium, Greece 
and Luxembourg have not ratified this Convention thus in principle not abiding to the 
normative rules that are being keenly imposed on others (Gatti, 2016: 302). Furthermore, 
Gatti shows in his work how there are some policies on human rights issues that the EU is 
promoting abroad, that are technically protected within the member states, but are interpreted 
in different ways thus implying that certain restrictions to human rights can be tolerable. This 
is for example the issue with freedom of expression and has been especially important in the 




Hypocrisy and inconsistencies between the EU human rights talk and practices at home have 
a clear effect on how the rest of the world perceives the EU. Whether it is living up to the 
self-imposed international and universal standards defines the extent to which the EU is seen 
as a normative model abroad. For this particular reason, it is especially important to study 
NPE in relation to the external perceptions of the EU and establish a strong link between the 
two fields of literature. If the real practices of the EU do not fall in line with its own rhetoric, 
moreover, with its own laws written in the treaties, it is hardly likely that the external 
perceptions of the EU will be positive in regard of seeing it as a credible and honest actor. 
The specific implication of this to the topic of the thesis would be that if the EU who is 
putting significant effort through its overall human rights rhetoric, agreements and even 
specified aid to promote human rights in Turkey and Jordan, does not itself live up to its own 
expected standards, it will likely be perceived by Turkey and Jordan as insincere or even 
straightforward hypocritical. 
The missing link: Normative power Europe and external perceptions literature 
While recognition by others might not necessarily be needed for great powers, it is 
unquestionably vital to the agency of normative powers. Although they can be regarded as 
‘self-made international actors’, normative powers require a certain degree of voluntary 
acceptance by the others in order to really claim themselves as such. This means that the 
relationships between normative powers and other international actors unlike with great 
powers are significantly more dialogical (Kavalski, 2013: 249). The concept of normative 
power as such requires recognition by the external actors. Otherwise, the essence of the 
concept would entail only claims about oneself and ones ideal aspirations but would lack any 
connection to being a power or in other words, an influencer in international terms. Emilian 
Kavalski has argued that normative power ultimately emerges as power in context meaning 
that it is not merely an internal property of an actor but depends on the interactions that this 
actor has in different contexts (Kavalski, 2013: 250). This idea has also been introduced by 
Reinhard Wolf who suggested that what is most important is not the perceptions and 
misperceptions of the external actors, but the subjective expectations and understandings of 
these actors which are strongly affected by cultural sceneries (Wolf, 2011: 113). This means 
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that it is the incidental context of each specific interaction that drives an external actor to see 
its’ partners behavior as normative or not. Therefore, normative power is not only about 
affecting the perceptions of the external actors, but mainly about framing the responses of 
these actors (Kavalski, 2013: 250). Erik Ringmar has taken this idea even a step further by 
arguing that “the reaction is far more important than the action itself and their reaction is 
what the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence” (Ringmar, 2012: 19). Thus, the EU 
is strongly motivated by a desire to be recognized as an actor that is not only capable, but 
also has the right to set the guidelines of what is considered to be normal in the world. 
Furthermore, Kavalski argues that since recognition is indicated by the attitudes, dispositions 
and behaviors of the target states, the actors who politically exist as normative powers are 
actually only the ones that are recognized as such by the target states (Kavalski, 2013: 258).  
The precondition for the EU to be considered a normative power is the outside world 
attributing that specific role to it (Larsen, 2014a: 897).The studies of external perceptions 
offer certain findings that are not merely relevant, but central to the debate of NPE. 
Furthermore, the external perceptions literature (EPL) in fact points to a rather limited 
perception of the EU as a normative power depending on the specific geographic area 
(Larsen, 2014a: 896). Similarly to Kavalski and Ringmar above, Henrik Larsen claims that 
the fields of NPE and EPL are in theoretical terms tightly related and it is surprising that the 
connections between the two have not really been addressed by many scholars. He admits 
that while references to NPE can at times be found in the literature on external perceptions, 
the opposite (references to external perceptions in NPE literature) is hardly common (Larsen, 
2014a: 896).  
As also visible from above, majority of the work on normative power focuses on the exercise 
of power. Meanwhile, little is written about the wider structural context that leads the external 
world to the adoption of the imposed norms. Larsen suggests that in order to really see 
whether the EU influences conceptions of what is normal in the international arena, one 
should be guided by a more structural conception of power – “power of an actor that looks 
at the context of meaning in which the actor is embedded” (Larsen, 2014a: 899). After all, 
power in political science is often theorized through relative relations between actors: Dahl 
21 
 
(1957) for example has suggested that power is the ability of A to get B to do something that 
B would not have done otherwise. Barach and Baratz (1963) have argued that power is the 
ability of A to control the agenda in order to influence B’s opportunities. The third dimension 
of power is A’s power to shape the beliefs and desires of B in order to get the latter to behave 
in compliance with what A wants (Lukes, 2005: 486). Based on these definitions of power, 
it is not possible to assess normative power as well without studying the real impact of EU’s 
behavior and the perceptions that are formed outside of the Union. Thus, when studying the 
normative impact of the EU in terms of human rights protection, it is crucial to include the 
external perceptions or the target countries of such promotion, such as Turkey and Jordan to 
see the real impact of this normative promotion. 
For the EU to have the status of a normative power either regionally or globally, the other 
international actors must perceive the EU as playing a special role as a beacon of norms. If 
that is not the case or is only the case to a limited extent, it is not likely that the EU will be 
able to influence the conceptions of what is normal through the use of normative power. 
However, it is also possible that the EU is considered a normative power in just one specific 
region or context. Furthermore, if the norms that the EU is trying to promote internationally 
match up with the dominant normative discourses in other parts of the world, it is more likely 
to be perceived as a normative leader (Larsen, 2014a: 900). There are two major reasons for 
why the EPL has not really taken up on the concept of NPE. First, the debate on NPE has 
been described to be too internal and isolated from other branches of European Studies and 
secondly, it has been criticized for its claims that the EU’s normative power is a result of 
spreading the universal values while the EPL rather suggests that the EU is shaping its own 
normative setting through specific political actions and that the perceptions of the external 
actions are important for defining what type of an international actor the EU is (Larsen, 
2014a: 901). As the primary focus of this thesis is on the external perceptions of the EU and 
the secondary focus on the effect of these perceptions on EU’s normative image, it is hereby 
important to also give an extensive overview of the external perceptions literature – its main 
importance in the study of international relations and more specifically EU as well as means 
for studying it and the findings that have surfaced from the studies of EPL scholars so far. 
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This is important for mapping the road for how to study the external perceptions of the EU 
in terms of its human rights rhetoric and practice and furthermore, on how this would connect 
to the perception of the EU as a normative model on human rights.  
1.2. External perceptions of the European Union 
The external perceptions literature on the EUis a rather new field of literature that has 
developed throughout the past two decades, mostly in parallel with the development of the 
normative power literature. It offers both theoretical and empirical knowledge on the issue: 
how the external perceptions are shaped, how they can be measured and what kind of external 
perceptions of the Union have surfaced from the existing empirical studies. The existing 
literature on external perceptions of the EU offers a perspective to the factors which might 
affect how the EU is perceived as a model on human rights and migration, what are the 
possible methods for studying this topic and what kind of dynamics in the external 
perceptions can be expected based on the earlier findings in the field. 
In line with some of the ideas from Henrik Larsen that I have introduced above, Natalia 
Chaban and Ole Elgström agree that outsiders’ perceptions of the EU are the key to the impact 
that the Union has internationally. In their work, they have presented a conceptual foundation 
for the study of external perceptions with explanations on why such field of study is relevant 
and what kind of connections the study of external perceptions has to other theoretical 
constructs such as legitimacy and credibility but also the study of EU coherence (Elgström 
& Chaban, 2015: 17). Elgström and Chaban argue that the analysis of the external perceptions 
of the EU is vital because, first of all, it  contributes to the insight we have about the EU’s 
self-identification and the roles that it plays in world politics. Secondly, it offers an 
understanding of how those roles influence the impact that EU policies have on the external 
actors (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 17-18). They suggest that the outcome of EU actions is 
shaped by how credible, legitimate and coherent it is perceived by the others, claiming that 
it is complicated to be a leader if the promises are not properly backed up by the actions. In 
other words, they argue that perceived incoherence between what is said and done as well as 
among EU institutions is likely to create obstacles to the effective actions of the Union 
(Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 18). This directly matters for being perceived as a model by the 
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external actors because the inconsistency between rhetoric and practice has a negative impact 
on the external perceptions, thus leading to a lower possibility of being considered a model 
worth imitating. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler as well have noted that the connection 
between internal consistency and coherence and the perceptions of the European 
Commission carry great importance (Bretherton & Vogler, 2005: 45). Similarly, Christopher 
Hill’s concept of the capabilities-expectations gap is strongly based on the external 
perceptions, focusing on the mismatch between the hopes external actors have for the EU in 
the international arena and its limited capabilities to meet these hopes (Hill, 1993). This leads 
us to the assumption that in case of internal inconsistencies and perceived lack of legitimacy 
of the EU in regard of human rights, the external actors will not perceive the EU to be a 
positive example or moreover, a model on human rights.  
On the opposite, Michito Tsuruoka has suggested that also the expectations deficit – the lack 
of expectations to the EU from external actors – is equally important to address (Tsuruoka, 
2008: 7-8). Either way, such expectations might be dangerous to the success of the EU and 
deserve to be studied in more detail. The lack of expectations to the EU might be bad for the 
success of the Union because it might indicate that the EU is a weak actor who is not expected 
to act notably and thus in not expected to have an impact on the rest of the world to begin 
with. However, it has been noted by prominent scholars who have contributed to the EPL 
that there is still a relative lack of theoretical studies in this area (Chaban et al., 2006: 246; 
Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010: 3) and thus a need for more such studies in the field (Elgström 
& Chaban, 2015: 20; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010: 3). This means that while there is not 
much theoretical material on the field available yet, this thesis will offer an additional 
valuable contribution to the study of external perceptions of the EU. 
How are external perceptions shaped? Endogenous and exogenous factors.  
Before getting to the study of external perceptions as such, it is first important to discuss the 
sources and influential factors of such perceptions. Tsuruoka (2008) has divided the factors 
influencing the formation of external perceptions of the EU into two categories: exogenous 
(external) and endogenous (internal) ones. The categorization of endogenous and exogenous 
sources stems from the perspective of the external actors. This means that the influence that 
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the state of the EU with the successes and failures it has on the third parties is considered to 
be an exogenous factor while the factors within these third countries, such as domestic 
political situation which is not directly related to what the EU is doing are endogenous factors 
(Tsuruoka, 2008: 9-10). Out of the exogenous factors, it is a general rule that the success of 
the EU tends to provoke more positive perceptions of it and raise the reputation of the EU in 
the world. On the opposite, the failures tend to generate skeptical viewpoints and thus might 
damage the EU’s international position (Tsuruoka, 2008: 9). Exogenous factors that have 
successfully boosted positive external perceptions of the EU include, for example, the 
establishment of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the enlargement and the 
launching of the single currency. On the other hand, failures leading to negative perceptions 
include for example the disability to act and speak in a common voice in the international 
arena and the relative economic underperformance of the Eurozone (Tsuruoka, 2008: 10).  
The endogenous factors are strongly dependent on the domestic discourses in the third states, 
thus for example the perceptions of the EU might be low in countries which perceive 
themselves to be superior to the EU, or countries which have different primary values, such 
as a strong support for military power (Tsuruoka, 2008: 9) or a diverse understanding of 
human rights, such as the US and China respectively. At the same time, the external 
perceptions of the EU are likely to be high if the domestic socio-political discourses support 
the European values (Tsuruoka, 2008: 9). In any case, the EU has little influence over the 
endogenous factors and thus needs to be careful about the unexpected external perceptions 
that might form abroad based on these factors (Tsuruoka, 2008: 13-15). The interplay 
between the exogenous and endogenous sources of perceptions is unique in every case study 
(Chaban et al., 2013: 447). This is why, when studying external perceptions about the EU, it 
is important to pay attention to all the possibly relevant factors within the external case study 
country in addition to the factors within the EU. With this distinction, it becomes possible to 
study what shapes perceptions of the EU – endogenous or exogenous factors. Therefore, 
when studying the external perceptions related to human rights practices in the EU, it is also 
crucial to map out any other possible endogenous and exogenous factors which may have an 
effect on these perceptions in Turkey and Jordan and try to control for such variables. 
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How to measure external perceptions? Elites, public and media.  
While it is clear that the external perceptions of the EU hold a great significance, they can be 
rather difficult to measure, especially if we are talking about the perceptions of states since 
there are various units that the states consist of: the individuals, social groups, state 
institutions, private organizations, leaders etc. Scholars (e.g. Chaban et al., 2013; Entman, 
2003: Elgström & Chaban, 2015) contributing to the EPL have broadly defined three layers 
of external perceptions: elite, media and public opinion. Below, the thesis will introduce each 
of these layers, give an overview of their importance in shaping the external perceptions and 
offer examples of how these layers have been studied by academics in the field so far. 
The ideas which are relevant to foreign policy get activated and spread from the higher levels 
of the system to the lower ones, from the top level of a layered system to the network of 
elites, news organizations and through them the wider public (Entman, 2003: 415). This 
model is called ‘cascade activation’ and works not only from the top down, but also from the 
bottom up because the media also works as a pumping mechanism making discourses from 
the lower levels heard by the higher ones (Entman, 2003: Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 24). 
The media is helping the least powerful group – the public – to activate and spread the foreign 
policy ideas and offer feedback to the elites and higher administrations. Ideally, an external 
perceptions study should take into account the perceptions on all of these layers (Elgström & 
Chaban, 2015: 24), however, this level of comprehensiveness is often difficult to achieve.  
Several important studies in the field have focused largely on images of the EU among 
national decision-, policy- and opinion makers within the third countries (e.g. Elgström & 
Chaban, 2015; Elgström, 2010; Chaban et al., 2013). Based on Entman’s three-layered 
argument, this would be the highest layer of the three. As for methodologies, the focus has 
generally been on semi-structured elites and face-to-face interviews (Elgström & Chaban, 
2015: 25). Somewhat differently however, Ole Elgström has investigated external 
perceptions among international negotiators in various multilateral settings. Although his 
study is also mainly based on semi-structured elite interviews, it is improved by including 
studies of EU appearances that have surfaced in media discourses, official documents and 
the talk of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Elgström, 2010; 2014). In addition to 
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semi-structured interviews with elites, focus-group interviews have also proved to be 
efficient in certain studies (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 25). As conducting interviews with 
high-level officials in Turkey and Jordan would be out of reach for this study, official 
speeches and statements of leaders will be analyzed instead to figure out the official 
perceptions of the two countries. 
The images among the general public have been rather under-addressed in the field of EU 
external perception studies. However, their importance should not be disregarded as 
previously explained in the introduction of the term cascade activation. The general 
impressions of the public or in other words, the civil society, is considered to be the lowest 
layer of the three-layered system. When studying the perceptions of the public, majority of 
the studies are based on survey data because this methodology allows gathering information 
from the large masses (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 26-27). However, in the case of this study, 
the perceptions of the civil society with a special focus on the NGOs working with refugees 
will be examined through semi-structured interviews in order to get more focused and 
detailed information on the issue. 
As explained above, media can be considered to be the cross-section between the levels of 
public and elite, present both in the foreign policy ideas moving from top to bottom and the 
opposite. In other words, media is the middle layer of the three-layered system. 
Methodologically, research on this level relies on content analysis based on data from print 
or television news and social media (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 27). As the preliminary 
findings on the topic of this thesis did not show sufficient available data on the external 
perceptions of the EU in Turkey’s and Jordan’s news media regarding the Union’s human 
rights practices, including the analysis of this layer in the study would not be justified.  
As a general summary of the introduced levels of EU external perceptions studies, Elgström 
and Chaban have noted that the perceptions are “the most informed, nuanced, multifaceted 
and dynamic” (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 28) on the level of elites while the general public 
has showed slightly colder and slower changing image of the Union. For this study, it would 
mean that in case of inconsistencies between EU human rights rhetoric and practice, the 
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leaders perceptions would have changed more drastically than the perceptions of the civil 
society.  
Issue and region specificity in the external perceptions studies. 
The existing scholarship on EU external perceptions is lacking systematic investigation on 
whether the perceptions are varying in different issue areas. Elgström, Chaban and other 
prominent scholars of EPL have claimed that majority of the studies in the field only present 
a one-dimensional picture of the EU as a leader while it is actually likely that it might be 
considered a great leader or power in one area or region and the opposite in another one 
(Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 29; Chaban et al., 2013: 433). They argue that external 
perceptions are issue specific, multilayered and differentiated (Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 
29; Chaban et al., 2013: 433). For this study it means that any kind of perceptions of the EU 
related to its human rights practice or treatment of migrants do not necessarily have to be the 
same in other issue areas. In other words, negative perceptions of the EU in terms of a 
normative model on human rights or migration do not necessarily mean that the EU is 
perceived negatively in general or in any other specific issue areas. 
Natalia Chaban and her colleagues have noticed that there are scholars who see the EU as a 
great power or even a superpower, such as Reid, Schnabel and McCormick whereas many 
academics such as Zielonka and Menon have observed the EU oppositely – to be divided, 
weak and a declining power (Chaban et al., 2013: 435). It is suggested that the strong 
variation in these images is at least partly caused by the fact that the thematic focus of the 
studies has been different. It seems to be a trend that the studies focused on EU’s economic 
and commercial potency often show the great-powerfulness of the Union while the weak-
power conception has been suggested by scholars focusing on EU security policy and the 
diplomatic failures. However, there is also an ‘in between’ to these two extremes: some 
academics have regarded the EU as a civilian, ethical or normative power or simply as a 
developmental actor based on various factors (Chaban et al., 2013: 435). The issue specific 
perceptions are in turn also dependent on the regions, for example in the eastern neighbors 
such as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU is often perceived to be a 
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normative leader whereas several big rising powers such as Brazil, China, Russia and India 
do not perceive the EU as such (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012). 
Thus, when studying external perceptions of the EU, it is important to acknowledge that the 
findings are likely to be dependent on the specific issue area or geographic regions and should 
not be carelessly generalized. Doing the latter is likely to give ground to incomplete or even 
false assumptions of the EU and does not represent good research credibility. Moreover, 
when studying effects of the EU human rights practice and treatment of migrants, it means 
that this study can make conclusions only on that specific topic. 
Existing studies and findings on EU external perceptions. 
In his review of the external perceptions literature on the EU, Henrik Larsen has come to five 
major conclusions of the findings. First, he has observed a general finding that while the EU 
is widely seen as an international actor across various issue areas, it is not perceived as a 
great power in all the fields. The second observation is that the predominant perception of 
the EU is that of an international economic power. Third, Larsen has reflected that the Union 
is perceived to be playing a distinct role in global politics. The fourth observation constitutes 
that the EU is seldom seen as a prominent international actor who has influence in the field 
of development. And last, Larsen claims based on the existing studies that the EU is mostly 
not seen as a normative power as it is defined by Ian Manners (Larsen, 2014b: 13).  
The latter is especially alarming from the perspective of the EU who in its core values and 
actions in the international arena clearly pursues towards the generally accepted image of 
itself as a normative power. Larsen admits that the EU may still be a normative power in 
certain regions and contexts while not in others but emphasizes that it is vital for the external 
actors to approve its normative role in the world for it to fully exist (Larsen, 2014b: 14). He 
suggests that one of the reasons for the existence of such gap between EU’s self-perception 
and the external images of it might be a communication deficit between the two (Larsen, 
2014b: 15). In any case, the dominant external perceptions of the EU confirm that the Union 
has a potential of being perceived as a leader and a significant power in the world. However, 
it is facing several challenges on realizing this potential, such as the communication gap with 
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the rest of the world and the internal inconsistencies weakening the legitimacy and coherence 
of the Union. The latter factor, as I have also discussed in more depth above in the subchapter 
of normative power EU, is what enables the EU to come off as a normative model or perhaps 
even normative power in the international arena. While the existing literature on external 
perceptions shows that more often than not the EU is not perceived as a normative power in 
the rest of the world, the findings of the studies are rather general and have not fully focused 
on specific issue areas, regions and most importantly reasons behind such cold and distant 
perceptions. 
The existing studies in EPL have primarily focused on the perceptions of the EU in big states, 
many of which are often perceived to be superpowers such as the US, China, India, Brazil 
and Russia (e.g. Barcevičius et al., 2015) or states in regions such as the Pacific, Southeast 
Asia and Africa (e.g. Chaban et al., 2013). The common theme among these studies is that 
while they are in a way focusing on specific issue areas such as the EU as an ‘economic actor’ 
or ‘ideological actor’ (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010), there is a gap in the literature 
addressing more specific areas for external perceptions, such as the perceptions of the EU as 
a human rights actor/protector. Additionally, there is also a lack of studies of the external 
perceptions of the EU in Middle-Eastern countries such as Turkey and Jordan. Lucarelli and 
Fioramonti (2010) have studied the EU mediation role in the region using the case studies of 
Iran and Lebanon, which is one of the few EU external perceptions study in the region. 
However, it does not touch upon EU as a normative power or model on human rights.  
Natalia Chaban and Ana-Maria Magdalina have studied the relationship between the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and perceptions of the EU regarding its soft or normative 
power and claimed that the crisis has been seen to damage the image of the Union as an 
‘economic powerhouse’, thus having a negative effect on its image of normative power 
(Chaban & Magdalina, 2014: 195). This connection gives ground to an assumption that when 
the EU is failing in one of the areas it is expected to be successful and exemplary at, its 
normative power in the world decreases. An extensive study from 2015 by Barcevičius and 
his colleagues also reveals that while the EU was often perceived to carry normative features 
in association to human rights, the EU’s actions regarding human rights related to the 
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refugees received rather negative comments and triggered doubts about the applicability of 
EU norms in that specific context (Barcevičius et al., 2015: 19).  
This chapter has insofar shown what it means to be a normative power, how it is constructed 
and how it relates to external perceptions. The introduced theoretical arguments suggest that 
the ability of the EU to shape the normality in the international arena can only work in reality 
if it is perceived by the others in a way that they see the EU as a normative model or an 
example worth following. While the EU is trying to construct its normative power through 
various means including its normative basis – the treaties, it is not likely to work out unless 
the EU itself also acts in accordance with its very own norms. Otherwise, the theory suggests 
that the EU would be seen as illegitimate or hypocritical, both of which undermine the 
perception of the EU as a desirable normative model. In the context of studying external 
perceptions of the EU related to its human rights rhetoric and practice, it is clear that if the 
EU human rights practice falls behind the standards that the Union itself has embedded in its 
treaties, promised to protect and promote in the rest of the world, the EU will lose its 
credibility as a normative model on human rights. In other words, it is expected that if there 
are inconsistencies between the EU human rights rhetoric and practice, the EU will not be 





This chapter will outline the methodology of the thesis. 
2.1. Case selection and research design 
To study the external perceptions of the EU and to identify the effect that the EU human 
rights practice has on these perceptions, a comparative case study of two cases will be 
conducted applying the most different systems design (MDSD). Controlled comparison of 
two different topically relevant cases helps to control for the possible intervening endogenous 
and exogenous variables that might affect the external perceptions of the EU and allows to 
study the direct effect of the consistency of EU human rights rhetoric and practice.  
The chosen case studies: Turkey and Jordan are selected for four reasons. First of all, they 
are both major refugee hosting states themselves, thus inarguably in need and interest of 
solutions on how to respond to the large volumes of incoming migrants. As discussed above, 
the existing literature suggests that it is possible to best observe external perceptions of the 
EU in countries that interact with the EU in issue areas that are of high relevance to 
themselves (Chaban et al., 2013; Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012). Second, these two countries 
are both geographically on the Eastern Mediterranean Migration Route towards the EU1, 
calling for strategic cooperation and shared approaches on the issue. Third, Turkey and 
Jordan are particularly relevant case studies because of the EU’s efforts to have these states 
pay more attention to human rights (European Commission). Following from this, the EU 
has an interest in projecting normative power to these countries. The fourth reason for 
choosing these case studies is the lack of existing literature, especially focused on the issue 
area of migration, on the external perceptions of the EU in these countries despite their 
geographical location in the close proximity of the Union. Thus, by focusing on  these 
specific cases, this research will contribute to the EPL from an angle that has not yet been 
discussed and directly answers to the calls of prominent EU external perceptions scholars 
 
1 IOM. The World’s Congested Human Migration Routes in 5 Maps. Available at 




who have pointed out the necessity for further studies in the field (Chaban et al., 2006: 246; 
Elgström & Chaban, 2015: 20; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010: 3). 
The time frame of the empirical case study is from the peak of the European migrant crisis 
in 2015 until the time of writing this thesis in late 2020. This time frame is chosen because it 
is the time during which a specific type of migration approach – the use of hotspot refugee 
reception facilities has been used on the borders of the EU in Greece and Italy. In other words, 
focusing on this time period is essential for the framing of the independent variable of the 
thesis – the consistency of EU human rights rhetoric and the human rights practice within the 
hotspot refugee camps. Second, this means that it is the time frame during which we can 
expect to see consequences of the expected discrepancies between the EU human rights talk 
and practices. Furthermore, this is the maximum possible timeframe for the study given that 
it covers the whole European migration crisis, thus giving as much time as possible to identify 
the discrepancies and their effect. The consistency of the EU human rights rhetoric and 
practice will be measured on a nominal scale, with two options: consistent and inconsistent.  
It is expected that if there is inconsistency between the EU human rights rhetoric and practice, 
it will result in a decline of perceiving the EU as a normative model on human rights 
protection and migration both in Turkey and Jordan, thus confirming the effect of the 
consistency of EU human rights rhetoric and practice on the external perceptions of the 
Union. The dependent variable of the study – external perceptions of the EU will be measured 
on an ordinal scale, examining whether the perceptions of the EU as a normative model on 
human rights protection and migration have turned more positive, more negative or have not 
changed. 
The study is controlling for three intervening factors that might shape how the EU human 
rights practice reflects in the external perceptions of the EU in order to isolate the effect of 
human rights practice on the perceptions. The controlled variables of the research (presented 
in Table 1) include two exogenous (from the perspective of the case study countries) 
variables and one variable that has both endogenous and exogenous characteristics. The 
exogenous variables are EU humanitarian aid for refugee aid per refugee and EU funding for 
human rights promotion per capita. Both of these variables are crucial to control for as the 
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literature on normative power and development aid has suggested that the latter is a key 
element for the EU to exercise its normative power abroad and gain support to as well as 
simply spread its normative ambitions around the world (Birchfield, 2011). While Turkey 
and Jordan are both major refugee hosting states in the EU neighborhood, the magnitude of 
EU humanitarian aid for refugee aid per refugee that the Union has allocated to these states 
varies remarkably, standing at approximately 694€ in Turkey and 4,103€ in Jordan (per 
person). On the other hand, EU funding for human rights promotion per capita in Turkey is 
nearly a third higher than it is in Jordan. This means that based on the EU refugee aid per 
refugee, it would be expected to see Jordan having more positive external perceptions of the 
EU while based on the EU funding for human rights promotion per capita, Turkey should 
have more positive external perceptions of the Union. 
The controlled variable that has both exogenous and endogenous characteristics is called the 
state of general political relations with the EU and refers to an overall level of mutual 
understanding, cooperation and conflictual situations regarding political decisions and views. 
Previous studies on external perceptions of the EU have shown that the countries holding a 
colder relationship with the EU tend not to see it as a normative power while the ones with 
warm and positive relations are more likely to see it as one (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012). 
In line with the MDSD, this variable shows different results for Turkey and Jordan. The 
political relations between Turkey and the EU have been mostly negative following the failed 
attempts of making progress for achieving EU membership and the military coup attempt in 
July 2016 (Vatandaş, 2019). On the other hand, the relationship between Jordan and the EU 
has been friendly and positive with ever tighter cooperation within the same time frame 
(Europa Nu, 2017). This would suggest that the external perceptions of the EU in Jordan are 
more positive than in Turkey. 
The aforementioned variables are important to control for as all of them have the potential to 
influence the external perceptions of the EU as a model on migration and human rights 
protection. Using the MDSD research design ensures that all of these variables show different 
results in the case study states, thus ruling out the possibility of them having the main impact 
on the dependent variable of the study – external perceptions of the EU. All variables of the 
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study are presented in Table 1 with controlled variables indicated on a blue background, 
independent variable on the yellow background and the dependent variable on the red 
background. 
Variable Turkey Jordan 
EU humanitarian aid for 




(~ 4,103€)3  
EU funding for human rights 




(~ 0,26 €)5 
The state of general political 
relations with the EU 
mostly negative mostly positive 
Consistency of EU human 
rights practice (independent 
variable) 
no no 
(Expected decline of) 
perceiving EU as a 
normative model on 











2 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Turkey. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/turkey_en (Last accessed 12.05.2021). 
3 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Jordan. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/jordan_en (Last accessed 12.05.2021). 
4 Delegation of the European Union to Turkey. The EU and Human Rights. Available at 
https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-human-rights-767 (Last accessed 12.05.2021). 
5 Delegation of the European Union to Jordan. Jordan and the European Union. Available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/1357/jordan-and-european-union_en (Last accessed 12.05.2021). 
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2.2. Research methods used in the thesis 
The thesis first analyzes the EU human rights consistency by comparing the EU human rights 
rhetoric and practice. The second part of the analysis studies the external perceptions of the 
EU based on the (in)consistency of the EU human rights rhetoric and practice by studying 






Graph 1. The structure of the analysis. 
To gather data for the independent variable of the thesis – consistency of EU human rights 
practice, the human rights conditions in the hotspot first reception facilities in Italy and 
Greece will be assessed and compared to the relevant EU human rights documents to search 
for possible inconsistencies. To study the human rights conditions in the hotspots, the study 
will conduct a document analysis of two reports conducted by the FRA during the designated 
time period of the research: in 2016 and 2019. The conditions and related human rights gaps 
in the hotspot facilities will be compared to relevant articles of the EU human rights 
documents such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and specific 
regulations and directives of the EU on the treatment of migrants and refugees. Based on the 
comparison of the relevant EU law and the data on human rights conditions in the hotspots, 
the thesis will be able to put forward an argument on whether there is inconsistency between 
the EU human rights rhetoric and practice. 
The methods used for measuring the dependent variable – external perceptions of the EU, 
include content analysis of the leaders speeches and statements, and semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of the civil society in Turkey and Jordan. Data gathered 
Consistency of EU 
human rights 














through these two methods will be complementary to each other and enable to provide a 
thorough analysis of the external perceptions of the EU as a model on human rights and 
migration.  
Content analysis will be used in the study because it is a highly flexible research method and 
a systematic, thorough approach to analyzing documents which have been obtained in the 
course of research (White & Marsh, 2006: 41). The steps of content analysis include 
sampling, collecting, analyzing and reporting (White & Marsh, 2006: 29). The process of 
qualitative content analysis is driven by the research question and the hypothesis of the study. 
Reading through the collected data will help the researcher to identify concepts and patterns 
which have been foreshadowed or are unexpected and thus provide new important aspects to 
consider (White & Marsh, 2006: 34). The analysis of new cases will continue until no new 
patterns related to the studied concept emerge, leading to the presumption that all relevant 
patterns have been discovered (White & Marsh, 2006: 37). Thus, qualitative content analysis 
is suitable for this thesis because it allows to explore in depth all the emerging perceptions 
of the political elites through close analysis of their statements. 
Semi-structured interviews will be used for studying the external perceptions of the civil 
society representatives because this method allows for retrieving information directly from 
the interviewees through open-ended directed questions. This method is perfect for a small-
n sample to explore the independent thoughts of the individuals in the sample (Adams, 2015: 
493-494). Semi-structured interviews allow for a dialogue between the interviewer and the 
interviewee with the option of asking follow-up questions and discovering unforeseen issues 
on the topic that is being studied (Adams, 2015: 493). The steps of semi-structured interviews 
include preparation of the questions outline, planning and setting up the interviews, 
conducting the interviews, taking notes, transcribing and analyzing the interview content, 
thus making it a time-consuming method. However, it offers more benefits than for example 
a questionnaire which would not allow for further explanations or a focus group interview 
which might keep the interviewees from extensively sharing their honest opinions. Thus, 




The speeches and statements of the leaders – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey 
and Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein, the king of Jordan were retrieved from their respective 
websites67. The sample of the speeches and statements was collected by using the key word 
‘European Union’ in the search engine of both of the websites’ ‘speeches and statements’ 
English language section for the time period of 1 January 2015 until 13 April 2021 (the date 
of starting the analysis of the speeches and statements). The key word ‘European Union’ had 
to be included either in the title or the full text of the speech or statement to be included in 
the sample. Altogether 175 results from the chosen time period came up by using the key 
word from Erdoğan’s speeches and statements and 74 results from King Abdullah II’s 
speeches and statements. All of these speeches were then examined by searching for further 
key words ‘refugee’ and ‘human rights’ within them to find the speeches and statements 
touching upon topics relevant for the analysis of this thesis. Out of the original sample, 30 
speeches and statements by President Erdoğan and 14 speeches by King Abdullah II were 
chosen for use of the final analysis, following the principle of data saturation. The chosen 
speeches and statements were selected for giving the best insights into the leaders’ 
perceptions on the EU in regard to human rights and migration. 
The semi-structured interviews for measuring the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey 
and Jordan were conducted with nine NGO representatives from these countries, five from 
Turkey and four from Jordan. The interviewees were found through directly contacting 
NGOs that work with refugees and further through their personal and professional networks. 
All the interviewees are representatives of local NGOs working with the refugees in the case 
study countries. The five representatives from Turkey altogether represent three different 
NGOs in Turkey and the four representatives from Jordan represent three different NGOs in 
Jordan. The interviewees were provided with a consent form (see Annex 2) before the 
interview  and agreed to it orally in the beginning of the interview. Out of the nine 
interviewees, eight agreed to the interview being recorded for the purpose of writing the 
thesis. The recordings of the interviews were deleted once the transcriptions were made. The 
 
6 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. Available at https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/.  
7 His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al-Hussein. Available at https://kingabdullah.jo/en.  
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interviewees were also offered a possibility to see the outline of the interview questions ahead 
of the interview upon their request. All of the nine interviewees used this opportunity. The 
interview outline (see Annex 1) included eight questions regarding the interviewees’ 
awareness of EU human rights rhetoric and practices, and their perceptions of the EU as a 
human rights model. Additionally, some questions asked about the treatment of refugees in 
the EU hotspot refugee reception facilities and the perceptions of the EU as a model on 
migration and treatment of refugees, especially in comparison to the case study countries. 
The interviews took place over Zoom meetings between April 23, 2021 and May 7, 2021. 
The exact dates and times of the interviews are presented in Annex 3.  
This chapter has introduced the research plan and methods of the thesis as well as described 
the data which will be used for studying EU human rights rhetoric and practice and the 
external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan. The next chapter will apply the 
introduced methods on the data, thus enabling to answer the research question of the study 




3. European Union Human Rights Rhetoric and Practice 
This chapter of the thesis provides insights to the human rights rhetoric of the EU based on 
the key legal documents related to the field. The chapter then goes on to findings of the 
analysis of the human rights practice in reality in the hotspot refugee and migrant reception 
facilities in Greece and Italy in 2016 and 2019 and concludes with an analysis of the 
consistency between the rhetoric and practice. 
3.1. European Union human rights rhetoric 
The EU human rights rhetoric has been deeply embedded into the treaties of the Union 
alongside with the emphasis on democratic governance and solidarity. Article 2 of the Treaty 
on the European Union (TEU) claims that the Union “is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” 
(TEU, 1992). Additionally, Article 3 of TEU states that “In its relations with the wider world, 
the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection 
of its citizens” (TEU, 1992), while also specifically stating that it will contribute to the 
protection of human rights in the world. The main documents constituting the EU human 
rights rhetoric are the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU, year) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1952).co Additionally, in the 
context of the topic of the thesis it is useful to apply certain articles from the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 (UN General Assembly, 1951) and the Protocol of 1967 Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UN General Assembly, 1967), which have been ratified by 149 countries 
over the world, including all of the EU Member States (UNHCR). The specific articles of the 
mentioned legal documents will be discussed in the after next section focusing on the EU 
human rights practices in the hotspot migration reception facilities. 
In every five years, the Council of the European Union composes a new EU Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy laying out the strategic framework and planned activities to 
further strengthen the protection of human rights both within the EU and abroad. The EU 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for 2015-2019 (Council of the European 
Union, 2015) covers most of the period that the thesis is focusing on. In the document, the 
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EU reaffirms its commitment both to the protection and promotion of all human rights 
without distinguishing between the type of rights and calls all the states in the world to ratify 
and implement the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Council of 
the European Union, 2015: 9). It also mentions Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union 
by which the EU has committed itself  to promote human rights through all its external 
actions and furthermore, states that the EU and its Member States are committed to set an 
example in ensuring respect for human rights (Council of the European Union, 2015: 10). 
This would mean that in their behavior, the EU as a whole, including all its institutions – and 
specialized agencies who deal with migrants and asylum seekers at the EU external borders, 
as well as the Member States, should always keep in mind the protection of human rights and 
avoid any breaches in the field – first, because of their commitments for the sake of human 
rights themselves and second, in order to be seen as the positive example.  
As a follow-up to the commitment of being an example on human rights, the action plan also 
states that “The EU seeks to prevent violations of human rights throughout the world and, 
where violations occur, to ensure that victims have access to justice and redress and that those 
responsible are held to account.” (Council of the European Union, 2015: 10). For achieving 
that, the EU takes upon a promise to promote human rights throughout all its external 
relations, strengthen its capability and mechanisms to use an ‘early warning system’ to 
prevent crises that might possibly lead to human rights violations and strengthen its 
cooperation with partners around the world, including other states, international 
organizations and the civil society (Council of the European Union, 2015: 10). 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is that the action plan specifically emphasizes among 
other social groups and minorities, the EU’s commitment to protect the rights of refugees and 
migrants (Council of the European Union, 2015: 10). The fourth main objective of the action 
plan titled “Fostering Better Coherence and Consistency” lists a sub-objective number 24 
focusing on migration, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants and asylum 
policies. It consists of seven actions which are noted to be the responsibility of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), European Commission and the Member States. Some of 
the most outstanding of these actions for the topic of the thesis include enhancing human 
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rights safeguards in every migration and mobility related dialogue, cooperation framework 
with third countries, migration related process and program and to ensure the introduction to 
human rights protection elements to the immigration and border agencies (Council of the 
European Union, 2015: 37). This means that the EU personnel dealing with migrants at the 
EU’s external borders is committed to these standards as well. With specific mention to the 
processes related to migration, this action thus also directly related to the EU hotspot 
approach which will be explained in the next section of the thesis. Another action worth 
mentioning is to support even better access to justice and health for migrants both in their 
countries of origin and the countries that they move through while in transit; to promote 
enhanced conditions of detention to the migrants and in general to find alternatives to the use 
or regular detention for irregular migrants. Furthermore, the action puts focus on paying more 
attention to vulnerable migrants, including unaccompanied minors (Council of the European 
Union, 2015: 38).  
Based on these actions set in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, and 
keeping in mind the suggestions of NPE literature which argues that a normative actor itself 
should abide to its normative standards (Aggestam, 2008: 4; Manners, 2008b: 45; Whitman, 
2001: 6) in order to be influential among others, it can be expected that the EU is foremost 
focusing on pursuing these goals throughout its routine and prompt processes related to 
migrants, such as the hotspot approach and other related processes. As part of its normative 
basis, the EU has committed itself to safeguarding human rights, both internally and in its 
external relations, including in its treatment of migrants. These commitments, as they can be 
found in the treaties as well as in subsequent Council directives and regulations, form the 
EU’s human rights rhetoric. 
3.2. ‘Hotspots’ – the first reception facilities in Greece and Italy 
This section turns from EU’s rhetoric and formal legal commitments to its concrete actions 
in the field. The ‘hotspot’ approach was developed by the European Commission during the 
summer of 2015 following the unprecedented influx of irregular migration to the EU and was 
aimed to tackle the challenges on the southern borders of the Union, especially in Italy and 
Greece. The more specific aim of the hotspot approach is to build a platform for the relevant 
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agencies to actively intervene and assist the frontline Member States during a crisis induced 
by heavy mixed migratory flows (European Commission, 2015a: 2). Mixed migration is a 
term that ultimately means a flow of cross-border movement consisting of refugees, asylum 
seekers, victims of trafficking or other migrants who wish to migrate to a country with better 
living conditions and opportunities (MHub). According to the hotspot approach introduced 
in 2015, the EU through its different agencies will provide operational support on 
registration, identification, fingerprinting and debriefing of asylum seekers and handling the 
returns of the irregular migrants (European Commission, 2015b) who are not applying for 
asylum and do not meet the criteria of a refugee. The explanatory note on the hotspot 
approach conducted by European Commission conclusively states that “In principle, an 
external border section should be considered to be a “Hotspot” for the limited period of time 
during which the emergency or crisis situation subsists and during which the support of the 
“Hotspot” approach is necessary.” (European Commission, 2015a: 3). 
The first country where the hotspot approach was implemented in 2015 was Italy, shortly 
followed by Greece and the two have remained the only Member States in the EU to host the 
hotspots. The operational coordination on the ground in the hotspots is coordinated by an EU 
Regional Task Force (EURTF) who is responsible for the overall coordination and 
information exchange of all the teams and experts (European Commission, 2015a: 3). The 
other EU agencies working in the hotspots are the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 
the EU Border Agency (Frontex), the EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) and the EU 
Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust), all of which have a separate, but complementary to 
each other task to focus on in the hotspot approach (European Commission, 2015b). Frontex 
offers support to the Member States in the identification process and screening of the 
migrants, as well as collects information on the migration routes and facilitators of migration 
towards Europe (European Commission, 2015a: 1). EASO is supporting the Member States 
with expert knowledge throughout the asylum process and oversees the asylum application 
process carried out by the national authorities in the hotspots (European Commission, 2015a: 
1-2). Europol is included in the hotspot approach to support the Member States by offering 
expertise and assistance when it comes to cross-border organized crime and terrorism while 
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Eurojust supports the coordination between national investigations and prosecuting 
authorities of several Member States in cases related to serious organized crime and terrorism 
(European Commission, 2015a: 2).  
Despite the organizational and procedural assistance that the named EU agencies offer to the 
Member States, the hotspot approach does not include providing or maintaining the reception 
facilities as this is an obligation set for the hosting Member States (European Commission, 
2015a: 5) . This means that while the EU is offering operational support to the struggling 
Member States through the hotspot approach, they have decided not to institutionally 
interfere when it comes to building and maintaining the physical reception cites in these 
hotspots, including the camps hosting the migrants during the time of processing their 
applications. 
In 2015, 1.83 million irregular border crossings were registered by Frontex in the EU, 1.04 
million – and five times as much as during the previous year – of which occurred in Greece 
and Italy (European Parliament, 2016: 1-2). By 2016, eleven hotspots introduced in the 
previous paragraphs had been created in the named Member States – six in Italy and five in 
Greece. However, in March 2016 when the European Parliament published the first briefing 
on the state of play of the hotspots and emergency relocation, only three of the eleven 
hotspots had become fully operational while the rest were still requiring maintenance on the 
facilities or awaiting a political decision by the national governments to be allowed to open 
(European Parliament, 2016: 1;7). Four of the hotspots in Italy are located in Sicily – in 
Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Augusta and Trapani, one in Lampedusa and one in the mainland 
in Taranto. As of March 2016, only the hotspots in Pozzallo and Porto Empedocle were fully 
operating (European Parliament, 2016: 7).  
The five hotspots in Greece are all located on the Aegean Islands: Lesvos, Chios, Samos, 
Leros and Kos. During the writing of the European Parliament report on the state of play of 
the hotspots in March 2016, only Lesvos was a functional hotspot. The reception capacity of 
the Lesvos hotspot is the highest of all the eleven combined with its two centers Moria and 
Kara Tepe holding 2,079 places in 2016, followed by Chios with 2,250 places. The reception 
capacity of Samos, Leros and Kos hotspots is similar to the ones in Italy ranging between 
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290 and 650 places (European Parliament, 2015: 8). The locations of the hotspots in Italy and 
Greece are shown on image 1. 
Image 1. Original locations of the hotspots. Sources: European Commission, 2015c; 
European Commission, 2015d. 
Despite the fact that the implementation of the hotspot approach started only in late 2015, 
there had already been concerning reports on the conditions in the hotspots back then. The 
European Parliament briefing report on the state of play in the hotspots in 2016 states that 
some NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) severely criticized the First Aid and 
Reception Centre in the hotspot in Pozzallo, Italy drawing attention to overcrowding, 
unsanitary conditions, poor separation between women, children and men, insufficient legal 
and medical services and a general lack of contact with the rest of the world (European 
Parliament, 2016: 8). Overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions in the reception areas and 
facilities were also reported and criticized by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) while Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reported that the hotspot 
approach has caused confusion and led to thousands of people queuing outside on the island 
of Lesvos without access to essential sanitation needs such as water and toilets. Such reports 
and concerns culminated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) to note in January 2016 that the first line reception capacity in the Greek hotspots 
is undeveloped and below the EU standards (European Parliament, 2016: 9). As a reaction to 
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the described reports by NGOs and other agencies working with refugees, the co-rapporteurs 
from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs have stated that since the 
essential purpose of the hotspots is providing protection and humanitarian aid to the ones in 
need, the categorization of the migrants in the hotspots should not threaten respect for 
fundamental rights for those who have not been granted international protection yet or to 
whom it has been rejected (European Parliament, 2016: 11). 
Following the European Parliament report in March 2016 on the state of play in the hotspots, 
the Parliament has conducted two similar follow-up reports on the situation in the hotspots 
in June 2018 and September 2020. The situation report from 2018 reveals that at that time all 
of the five hotspots on the Greek islands were fully operational while the ones in Lesvos, 
Chios and Samos islands were severely overcrowded. According to the report around 700 
extra places had been created in these camps in order to tackle the overcrowding, bringing 
the overall capacity to 6,338 places. However, in June 2018 the total number of refugees in 
these hotspots was more than 16, 500 (European Parliament, 2018: 3). A reflection on the 
total capacity and the actual occupancy of the Greek hotspots as of May 2018 can be seen in 
Table 2. The overcrowded hotspots are indicated on a red background. 
Hotspot in Greece Total reception capacity Actual occupancy  
(May 2018) 
Lesvos 3,000 8,500 
Chios 1,014 1,533 
Samos 648 3,276 
Leros 980 924 
Kos 816 968 
Total 6,458 15, 201 
Table 2. Total capacity and actual occupancy of Greek hotspots in May 2018. Source: 
European Parliament, 2018: 3. Author’s compilation. 
In 2018, five hotspots had been established in Italy in Lampedusa, Messina, Pozzallo, Taranto 
and Trapani although the hotspot in Taranto was temporarily closed for maintenance in 
March 2018 and the hotspot in Lampedusa was only working with limited activities since 
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then (European Parliament, 2018: 3-4). The hotspots in Porto Empedocle and Augusta 
mentioned in the previous report in 2016 had been closed by 2018. The total capacity of the 
Italian hotspots including the ones closed for maintenance and working with limited services 
was 1850, but similarly to the Greek hotspots, the ones in Pozzallo, Trapani and Lampedusa 
exceeded the capacity of the reception facilities (European Parliament, 2018: 4). The exact 
number of migrants staying in the Italian hotspots in June 2018 has not been mentioned in 
the Parliament’s report. 
Similarly to the previous state of the play report on the hotspots in 2016, the report from 2018 
outlines a handful of problems that NGOs and EU agencies have observed in the hotspots. 
These problems include overcrowding, but also slow processing of the asylum applications, 
insufficient and slow detection of the vulnerable migrants, differential treatment of migrants 
of different nationalities, inappropriate living conditions including unsuitable conditions for 
children and a generally extended detention of refugees and migrants in the hotspots 
(European Parliament, 2018: 5). A final section of the report labelled ‘European Parliament’s 
position’ reads that “The European Parliament has underlined the need to ensure that the 
hotspot approach does not undermine the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers and refugees 
crossing the European borders. Parliament has aimed to identify and improve the detention 
and reception conditions for third country nationals in Europe.” (European Parliament, 2018: 
6). However, the report does not point out how the Parliament or other EU institutions and 
agencies are planning to improve named conditions or what has been done to avoid 
previously listed problems such as severe overcrowding and unsuitable living conditions. 
The last state of play report up to date that the European Parliament has published on the 
issue is from September 2020. Based on this report, the situation in the hotspots, especially 
in the ones on the Greek islands has worsened even more. All of the five hotspots on the 
Greek islands were still fully operational in the fall of 2020 while the occupancy rate in these 
hotspots exceeded the total capacity nearly four times (European Parliament, 2020: 5), 
demonstrating an even more serious overcrowding than stated in the previous reports. Based 
on the data from the Greek hotspots, the actual occupancy was 23, 269 in September 2020. 
However, according to UNHCR the real amount of refugees and asylum seekers living in the 
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hotspots and surrounding areas in the Aegean islands was around 27, 200 (European 
Parliament, 2020: 5). A reflection of the total capacity and the actual occupancy of the Greek 
hotspots as of September 2020 can be seen in Table 3. The overcrowded hotspots are 
indicated on a red background. 
Hotspot in Greece Total reception capacity Actual occupancy 
(September 2020) 
Lesvos 2,757 12, 767 
Chios 1,014 3,496 
Samos 648 4,643 
Leros 860 1,023 
Kos 816 1,340 
Total 6,095 23, 269 
*~27, 200 according to 
UNHCR 
Table 3. Total capacity and actual occupancy of Greek hotspots in September 2020. Source: 
European Parliament, 2020: 5. Author’s compilation. 
The report also indicates that the overcrowding in the Greek hotspots has led to rising 
pressure on security issues, medical services, waste management and the infrastructures in 
general thus making the situation critical. According to the report, the combination of poor 
conditions and the inefficient asylum application procedure has led to tensions in the 
hotspots, culminating in a big fire in the Moria center on the Lesvos island on 8 September 
2020, leaving nearly its whole population (more than 12, 000 people) without a shelter 
(European Parliament, 2020: 5). 
In fall 2020 only four of the hotspots in Italy still remained active – in Lampedusa, Messina, 
Pozzallo and Taranto although the activities in Lampedusa were still limited due to 
refurbishing works. The total occupancy of the first three Italian hotspots in September 2020 
was 405 persons and the Taranto hotspot did not host anyone at the moment. However, the 
report states that the island of Sicily where the hotspots of Messina and Pozzallo are located 
was at that moment nevertheless hosting more than 7,000 migrants and the region of Puglia 
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on the mainland nearly 4,000 migrants who were still waiting on a decision to their 
application (European Parliament, 2020: 6). Despite the somewhat more positive numbers 
presented hereby based on the situation report, the overall conditions, and problems that the 
migrants face in Italy are the same as the migrants in Greece face ranging from poor living 
conditions, overcrowding, slow asylum process and lack of information and medical 
assistance.  
The European Parliament state of play report on the hotspots from September 2020 claims 
that between 2015 and July 2020, the EU has provided Greece with €2,64 billion to help 
improve their migration and border management. Some of this financial support has been 
used for relocating refugees from the overcrowded camps, increasing the reception capacity, 
and assisting voluntary returns (European Parliament, 2020: 6). Meanwhile, the EU has 
supported Italy with €1,031 billion to assist with asylum, migration, security, and border 
management (European Parliament, 2020: 7). Yet, the EU has not made clear obligations or 
recommendations on how the recipient Member States should use this support nor 
encouraged them to use it directly for bettering the conditions in the hotspot reception centers. 
The report of September 2020 similarly to the previous two reports mentions the main 
concerns in the hotspot camps such as slow asylum application processing, related 
overcrowding at the reception facilities and resulting unsanitary and inappropriate living 
conditions. The report also states that “After an onsite visit in October 2019, the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, called for urgent measures to 
address the deteriorating situation in the hotspots, making reference to unhygienic conditions 
and deficiencies in the provision of medical care. After the Moria fire, Mijatović called for 
“a fundamental rethinking of the approach that led to the overcrowded, inhumane and 
completely unsustainable situation in Moria and elsewhere on the Aegean islands” (European 
Parliament, 2020: 8). On 16 April 2020, the Greek authorities in cooperation with the 
European Commission and some international organizations agreed to relocate 2,380 people 
from the overcrowded hotspot camps on the Aegean island to mainland Greece (European 
Parliament, 2020: 9). Nevertheless, even with this amount of persons relocated from the 
camps, they still remain severely overpopulated. 
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3.3. European Union human rights practice in the hotspots 
This section provides insights to the actual human rights practice of the EU (including the 
responsible Member States) in the hotspot reception facilities in Italy and Greece. The 
analysis is conducted based on two reports from 2016 and 2019 consisting the opinions of 
FRA on fundamental rights in the hotspots. FRA was established in 2007 with the aim of 
providing EU and its Member States’ institutions, bodies and agencies with assistance and 
expertise related to fundamental rights when implementing the Union law and to support 
them in taking necessary measures to fully comply with fundamental rights (Council 
regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Regulation 
168/2007, Article 2). The opinions on fundamental rights in the hotspots can broadly be 
grouped into five categories: access to international protection, rights of children, 
identification of vulnerable people, safety for everyone in the hotspots, and readmissions. 
Since the last category – readmissions – does not solely focus on the conditions within the 
hotspot facilities, the following analysis will only touch upon fundamental rights concerns in 
the first four categories. 
In general, the report from 2016 by FRA on the fundamental rights conditions in the hotspots 
states that despite the efforts made by the national and EU bodies, serious fundamental rights 
gaps persist in the facilities and throughout the processes. The report reveals that while some 
of these gaps can be identified only in specific hotspots, many of them are linked to the 
hotspot approach as such and thus affect all the hotspots in Italy and Greece. FRA suggests 
that majority of the fundamental rights gaps, especially in the hotspots in Greece are caused 
by the prolonged stay of migrants in the hotspots and claims that a wide variety of these gaps, 
especially the ones directly caused by overcrowding, could be avoided by a faster onward 
movement from the hotspots to the next facilities. The report states that unless the systemic 
issues identified by the FRA in the hotspots are addressed, the hotspot approach is deemed 
to fail in respecting the rights put forward in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU) and other relevant laws and regulations (FRA, 2016: 4). The 
update report conducted by FRA on fundamental rights in the hotspots in 2019 claimed that 
despite efforts to improve the situation, only three of the 21 opinions put forward in the 2016 
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report had been addressed in a way that had resulted in a significant improvement, two of 
which related to readmissions and only one to the human rights conditions within the 
facilities (FRA, 2019: 6). 
Access to international protection 
The main problems outlined by the FRA in 2016 related to access to international protection 
include delays in processing the applications of migrants and the lack of information for the 
migrants on how to proceed with their applications once they have made it to the hotspots in 
Greece and Italy.  
First, the FRA has found that processing the asylum applications in the hotspots is not speedy 
and clear enough, leaving the migrants applying for international protection in uncertainty 
and legal limbo (FRA, 2016: 4). Furthermore, it has been discovered that especially in the 
hotspots in Greece, migrants form certain nationalities have to wait for their asylum 
applications to be processed for several months whereas for migrants from some other 
countries this time is much shorter. This goes against Article 18 of the CFREU  by which 
“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” (CFREU, Article 18), meaning that while there might 
be a certain degree to what asylum applications are prioritized by nationality, this should not 
lead to discrimination based on nationality (FRA, 2016: 5), such as longer detainment of 
migrants who are from a ‘less prioritized’ origin country. In addition to the reference to 
Article 18 of CFREU and the within implied reference to the Geneva Convention (UN 
General Assembly, 1951), the FRA opinion includes a reference to the Asylum Procedures 
Directive (2013/32/EU) which requires Member States to make sure that migrants can lodge 
an asylum application as soon as possible once they have shown their interest for it (FRA, 
2016: 5). Considering the data which has proven that migrants from certain countries need to 
wait for this process for several months, it seems that obligations put forward in the Directive 
are not being fulfilled in the hotspots. The FRA follow-up report from 2019 states that while 
“Registration of the asylum claims is faster on the Greek islands, […] delays in conducting 
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first interviews are still significant” (FRA, 2019: 9), indicating that it is one of the 
fundamental rights gaps pointed out in 2016 which had not shown substantial improvements 
by 2019. 
Second, FRA reported that the significant delays in the asylum application process result in 
unaccompanied children and children with families who have already settled in one of the 
Member States to wait in conditions ill-suited for children (FRA, 2016: 5). This violates 
Article 24 of CFREU by which children have a right to protection and care necessary for 
their well-being; the public authorities and private institutions always have to make the 
child’s best interest a primary consideration in all actions related to the child; and every child 
has the right to regularly keep a direct contact with his or her parents (CFREU, Article 24). 
By keeping the children in the hotspot facilities with poor living conditions, insufficient 
medical care and no access to education, the authorities are thus not acting in the best interest 
of the child. The follow-up report from 2019 states that there have been no significant 
improvements in making the registration of asylum claim faster for unaccompanied children 
in Italy and Greece (FRA, 2019: 9). 
Third, FRA has addressed the issue of providing relevant information on how to proceed with 
the asylum applications which is a prerequisite for having access to the right to asylum as 
specified in the afore-mentioned Article 18 of CFREU and the Geneva Convention (UN 
General Assembly, 1951). While FRA has stated that remarkable efforts had been made in 
the hotspots by providing both oral and written informative materials on the asylum process, 
the capacity still was not enough to sufficiently cover all the arrivals in 2016 (FRA, 2016: 5). 
By 2019, FRA found that the situation had improved although still not resulted in significant 
advancements in the hotspots where the migrants still remained partly uninformed about the 
asylum processes (FRA, 2019: 9). 
Fourth, the FRA drew attention to problems related to the fingerprinting of irregular migrants. 
The asylum seekers and migrants who enter Europe through illegal means have an obligation 
to provide fingerprints for Eurodac for their registration in the system. The FRA found that 
while many of the migrants do not know the necessity of this process and are not given 
sufficient information on it, there have been instances of using physical force and even 
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detention in order to collect the fingerprints (FRA, 2016: 5). Depending on the exact 
treatment, this has in certain gases gone against the provisions of Article 1 – the right to 
dignity; Article 3 – integrity of a person; Article 4 – prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment and Article 6 – the right to liberty and security – of the 
Charter (CFREU). The 2019 report reveals that by then, use of excessive force had finished 
and there had been no more reports on violence or detainment due to fingerprinting by the 
asylum-seekers and migrants (FRA, 2019: 10) making it one of the three fundamental rights 
gaps that had been significantly improved by the EU and the Member States between 2016 
and 2019. 
Fifth, FRA points out the necessity of legal support as a prerequisite for full access to the 
right of asylum specifically stating that free legal assistance and representation has to be 
available throughout the appeal proceeding of the asylum seekers. Furthermore, FRA has 
noted that sufficient legal support in the first stage of asylum procedure could significantly 
speed up the whole asylum process and reduce the number of appeals (FRA, 2016: 6). The 
legal basis of this opinion stems from Article 47 of the Charter – the right to an effective 
remedy and to fair trial (CFREU, Article 47), also embedded in Article 20 of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. The 2019 update report shows that this issue had not shown any 
improvements within the three years in the Greek islands. Meanwhile, the asylum procedures 
in Italy are not carried out in the hotspots (FRA, 2019: 10) giving a possible explanation to 
why migrants and asylum seekers spend a significantly longer time in the hotspot reception 
facilities in Greece than in Italy. 
Rights of the child 
The fundamental rights gaps related to the rights of the child vary, but the main issue is 
children’s general well-being that is not being adequately secured. FRA has stated that 
systems in place are not able to guarantee the best interests of the child, referring to the 
absence of specialized accommodation capacity for children, especially unaccompanied 
children in the hotspots. Additional challenges persist through the lack of access to education 
and poor expertise and screening of the people working in the field of child protection on the 
hotspots (FRA, 2016: 6). 
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FRA found that in both Greece and Italy, many unaccompanied children who arrive to the 
hotspots receive a temporary guardianship from local public officials who do not have 
specialized child protection expertise. The FRA has found that this is a precondition to 
guaranteeing the child’s best interest and overall well-being as required by aforementioned 
Article 24 – the rights of the child – of the Charter and additionally by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (FRA, 2016: 6). The update report shows that this 
issue has been addressed by EU and the local authorities in Greece and Italy. However, no 
significant improvements on ground had been recorded as of 2019 (FRA, 2019: 10). 
Second, the FRA pointed out that children are in an especially high risk of neglect or abuse 
when they are not accompanied by close family members or legal guardians, thus they should 
be identified and registered as soon as possible and provided necessary protection in order to 
comply with Article 24 of CFREU (FRA, 2016: 6). As of 2016, this was not the case in Greek 
and Italian hotspots where cases related to separated children were not given a priority in 
identification and registration. As of 2019, the first assessment of the situation of separated 
children was usually taking place already upon arrival proving that the situation had 
improved. However, effective monitoring of the situation of these children after the first 
assessment still remained limited (FRA, 2019: 10). 
The third opinion is drawing on the aforementioned Articles 7 and 24 of CFREU and is 
additionally supported by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law which has 
made it clear that children should not be detained in inappropriate facilities (if at all) like the 
hotspots, especially once they have been registered (FRA, 2016: 7). The report claims that as 
of 2016, the chronic lack of suitable accommodation capacity and the related slow processing 
of children’s asylum application led to infringement of children’s rights (FRA, 2016: 7). By 
2019 the situation in the hotspots was somewhat better since separated and unaccompanied 
children were generally moved on from the hotspots in Italy after their first registration while 
in Greece they had to stay in the hotspot facilities but were not detained there and were 
granted a certain level of freedom of movement. Yet, the update report still noted that the 




Fourth, the FRA pointed out that EU law has specific requirements regarding the material 
conditions, healthcare, education, and child-specific activities which are aimed to guarantee 
children’s well-being and meet with every child’s special needs. However, these 
requirements had not in reality been fulfilled in the hotspots as of 2016 (FRA, 2016: 7). The 
update report from 2019 claimed that over the three years the conditions for children’s 
physical and mental well-being and education in the hotspots in Greece and Italy had got 
even worse, not showing any signs of improvement towards these requirements (FRA, 2019: 
11). 
Identification of vulnerabilities 
Numerous migrants and asylum seekers that arrive in the hotspots belong to different 
vulnerable groups such as children, people who have suffered through trauma related to 
armed conflict, losing family members back at home or on the way to Europe, history sexual 
abuse or human trafficking etc. These persons need to be quickly identified and taken care 
of keeping in mind their specific vulnerabilities. However, it is difficult to detect these 
vulnerabilities unless they are visible to the eye or if the vulnerable persons themselves share 
their experience. The hotspots are lacking standard operating procedures for identifying these 
vulnerabilities (FRA, 2016: 8). 
The first opinion put forward by the FRA regarding vulnerable persons refers to the 
Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) stating that it is a shared responsibility of all 
the actors including the EU agencies and Member States, authorities operating in the hotspots 
to identify and refer vulnerable people. Thus, it should be an integral part of the first reception 
and identification procedures and continue to be a constant priority. The FRA has claimed 
that these vulnerability identification procedures should actively involve experts such as 
medical, social, and psychological staff to work with the authorities throughout the 
identification process and that these experts should also be granted regular access to the 
hotspot facilities to conduct check-ups (FRA, 2016: 8). The 2019 report shows that there had 
been certain advancements in the field since the vulnerability identification processes had 
improved in both Greece and Italy. However, serious shortages of expert staff in the hotspots 
persisted (FRA, 2019: 11). 
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Second, the FRA noted the need to employ female staff members to contribute to 
safeguarding the dignity of women who have to undergo various procedures in the hotspots. 
Article 7 of the Charter ensures respect for everyone’s private life (CFREU, Article 7) and 
Article 15 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) ensures same sex staff to be 
available in the facilities in case an applicant should request it. The FRA argues that this 
plays an essential role in enabling the reporting of sexual and gender-based violence and also 
when carrying out procedures requiring physical contact. This is why the availability of 
female staff and interpreters has to be constantly guaranteed throughout the operation of the 
hotspots and taken into account while hiring the staff (FRA, 2016: 8). The update report of 
2019 revealed that while the proportion of female interpreters and staff of other authorities 
engaged in the identification processes had improved, the proportion of female police officers 
still remained significantly lower than that of male officers (FRA, 2019: 12). 
Safety of all persons in the hotspots 
Opinions on the safety of all persons in the hotspots are mainly addressing the fundamental 
rights gaps recorded in the hotspots in Greece where several problems tightly related to 
general overcrowding and poor living conditions have led to security issues in the facilities. 
FRA has also separately pointed out limited community outreach activities for the persons 
staying in the hotspots, general lack of information and extended stays. The combination of 
the mentioned factors has led to almost weekly demonstrations, riots, and outbursts of 
violence by frustrated and distrusting migrants and asylum seekers posing a threat to 
themselves and the staff working in the hotspots (FRA, 2016: 9). 
First, Article 41 of the Charter states the right to good administration (CFREU, Article 41) 
and thereby implies the right of the people staying in the hotspots to be informed of the 
procedures that are relevant for them. As it turns out from the 2016 FRA report, the provision 
of information on such procedures and rights is inconsistent among the migrants and asylum-
seekers in the hotspots and is often leading to tensions between them as they perceive a 
competition between each other (FRA, 2016: 9). The follow-up report from 2019 showed 
that there had been no improvements in information distribution and significant information 
gaps existed both in the hotspots in Greece and Italy. Furthermore, the issue had been outlined 
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as one of the main concerns by UNHCR’s inter-agency participatory assessment in the 
hotspots on the Greek islands (FRA, 2019: 12). 
Second, FRA found that women and girls face specific risks while staying in the hotspot 
camps because their execution and design does not allow to take into account certain issues 
that might pose a threat, for example assigning them to live together with strange men. FRA 
suggests that such risks should be thoroughly considered while planning and modifying the 
physical infrastructure of these facilities in order to comply with Article 18(4) of the 
Reception Conditions Directive (2013/32/EU) which urges the Member States to take 
necessary measures for preventing assault and gender-based violence, including sexual 
assault and harassment (FRA, 2016: 9). By 2019, the situation had not improved in the 
hotspots on the Greek islands where overcrowding had significantly increased the risk of 
sexual violence – most single women were not accommodated in separate areas and in the 
camps in Chios and Samos there was a lack of gender-separated sanitary facilities 
heightening the risk of gender-based violence even more (FRA, 2019: 12). 
The third opinion regarding the safety of people in the hotspots once again addressed the 
issue of children’s safety as they are facing a higher risk of violence and abuse as well as are 
more likely to be seriously affected by such experiences. FRA states that he hotspots should 
include physical security measures in the form of separate accommodation to families with 
children and unaccompanied children as well as safe areas for children which are guarded by 
specialized security staff (FRA, 2016: 9-10). This is necessary to comply with the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) by which states have a 
responsibility to guarantee the children’s safety form violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, 
and trafficking (UNCRC). The 2019 FRA report on the situation showed that the conditions 
in this regard had improved in Italy due to shorter stays in the hotspots. However, the 
situation in the Greek hotspots had not got significantly better and children continued to be 






When comparing the EU’s formal commitments with the actual practice, a gap between the 
former and the latter becomes visible. The EU’s treatment of migrants in the hotspots falls 
short of its human rights rhetoric. Therefore, there is inconsistency between EU human rights 
rhetoric and practice when it comes to the treatment of migrants in the hotspots. The human 
rights gaps persist both within the procedural work of the hotspots and in the physical 
conditions of the hotspot facilities, especially the camps hosting the asylum seekers who are 
waiting for a decision on their asylum application. The situation reports by FRA conducted 
in 2016 and 2019 show that there had been minimal improvements in the hotspots throughout 
these three years despite the fact that FRA had given their opinions on specific issues that 
hinder compliance with human rights and also had given advice on how to avoid these issues 
in the future. 
Majority of the human rights gaps outlined in the reports such as poor living conditions, 
tensions between the persons staying in the hotspots and unsafe conditions particularly for 
children and women are related to the severe overcrowding in the hotspot facilities. The 
overcrowding in return is a problem largely caused by the slow and unclear asylum 
application processes. While building and maintaining the facilities in the hotspots is 
primarily a responsibility of the Member States (Greece and Italy), the operational side of 
the hotspots is coordinated by EU agencies and thus a responsibility of the EU as a unitary 
body. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that Member States separately also represent 
the EU as a whole, especially throughout their actions related to issues of great significance 
to the Union such as immediate response to the migrant crisis. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the EU has not been living up to its own human rights standards and values when it comes to 
the hotspot approach. 
Reflecting on the theoretical background on normative power that has been introduced in the 
first chapter of the thesis, this means that while the EU is being normative in its stated values 
and intentions, it is not always acting in a normative way, such as in handling the hotspot 
approach and the hotspot reception facilities. That in return, based on the works of Manners 
and Whitman, could mean that since the normative essence of the EU – constituted through 
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its legal basis – does not entirely reflect through the real actions and practice of the EU, it 




4. External Perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan 
This chapter of the thesis entails the analysis and discussion of the data on the external 
perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan, focusing on the perceptions related to the EU 
human rights practice and treatment of refugees and migrants in general. 
4.1. Elite perceptions of the EU as a human rights model in the context of the treatment 
of migrants 
This subchapter focuses on the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan deriving 
from the statements of the political elite, more specifically – of the president of Turkey, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the king of Jordan, Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein between 2015-
2020. 
4.1.1. Turkey 
The statements of President Erdoğan regarding the perceptions of the EU, especially in 
relation to the approach to migration and human rights of the refugees and other migrants 
touch upon several issues. Erdoğan has criticized the EU for keeping its borders closed to the 
refugees and silently standing by while they are struggling to reach Europe. In an interview 
given in the end of January 2015, the President of Turkey said “The number of Syrian 
refugees in Europe is 130 thousand. We host 1.7 million, they host 130 thousand. Lebanon 
also accommodates 1.7 million Syrians. There are approximately 1 million Syrian refugees 
in Jordan.[…] The European Union remains silent.” (Erdoğan, 2015a). By stating out these 
numbers, Erdoğan tried to emphasize the imbalance of burden that was taken by the 
international community. In another speech held by Erdoğan around the same time, he 
addressed a question to the international community: “I would like to ask each and every one 
of your consciences the following question and address the whole world: […] Will solely 
feeling remorse […] for those millions of refugees exculpate us?” (Erdoğan, 2015b), pointing 
out that more actions are needed from the EU to help the refugees fleeing from the Middle 
East, especially from Syria. With even sharper nodes of criticism, Erdoğan said in April of 
the same year: “Those, who flee their countries on boats through the Mediterranean and 
Aegean, are drowning. They [the EU] say ‘let them drown, let them die’. Are not they human? 
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What about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?” (Erdoğan, 2015c), indicating that 
the EU is going against human rights by not doing enough for the refugees. A couple of 
weeks later the President of Turkey also argued that “The European Union approach the 
migration problem in the Mediterranean Sea from a security-oriented perspective instead of 
a humane one.” (Erdoğan, 2015d). Erdoğan repeated this stance at a joint press conference 
with European Council President Donald Tusk in September 2015, when he said that “It is 
unethical of Europe to approach these people, who are struggling for their lives, by thinking 
of its own comfort first. This attitude means Europe is turning its back to all fundamental 
values, it is based upon.” (Erdoğan, 2015e). 
While strongly criticizing the approach that the EU has taken on the migration crisis, Erdoğan 
has also clearly opposed this approach to the open-door policy that Turkey has taken, 
claiming it to be more humane than that of the EU’s. For example in September 2015, 
President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey has taken a humane, principled and determined 
stance to the refugee crisis while opening the doors to the refugees instead of watching them 
drown in the Aegean and Mediterranean (Erdoğan, 2015f). In October 2015, Erdoğan argued 
that “[…] we should also admit that the quality of hospitality we show to millions of people 
in our country has no match elsewhere on Earth. The situation of people in the refugee camps 
or those living in the cities with their own means or with support from others is very good 
compared to other countries.” (Erdoğan, 2015g). 
Erdoğan’s statements regarding the EU started on a somewhat more positive note in 2016 
with him saying on the 9th of May, the Europe Day, that:  
“on behalf of the international community, Turkey has undertaken responsibility in the 
face of these challenges [migration crisis stemming from Syria] and fulfilled its 
humanitarian duties since the very beginning. We are pleased to see that the same far-
sighted approach has been growing stronger in Europe and efforts have begun to  be 
exerted to alleviate the effects of humanitarian tragedy.” (Erdoğan, 2016a).  
Despite some positive impressions on the EU approach to the migration crisis on Europe 
Day, only a week later President Erdoğan argued that “tragedies that refugees in European 
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countries go through emanate from differences of viewpoint on the issue, because if it is a 
matter of means, European countries have means many times more than ours” (Erdoğan, 
2016b). By stating that, the President of Turkey was once again trying to show that the EU 
in his eyes should have done more for the refugees than it had at this point. 
In his further statements in 2016 President Erdoğan has strongly criticized the EU, suggesting 
that it has not been living up to its claimed values when it comes to caring for the refugees, 
indicating that the EU has been acting hypocritical. In June 2016, he said:  
“When 60 000 people gathered in Edirne [border province in Turkey], they [the EU] 
got very anxious, and started wondering about whether all those people would cross 
into Bulgaria or Greece. But in the meantime we are hosting three million refugees. 
Why? Because we care about people, unlike you. you have no such concerns […] this 
is your ugly face.” (Erdoğan, 2016c).  
A few days later President Erdoğan further argued that “the EU bloc’s bad humanitarian and 
immoral approach to immigrants has led to a serious debate about the trustworthiness of the 
European Union” (Erdoğan, 2016d).  
The President of Turkey has also used the criticism of the EU as hypocritical actor in terms 
of its response to the migration crisis to compare Turkey’s response and outline its strengths, 
such as being more caring and value-based. In June 2016, he said that “the enormous 
European Union couldn’t manage even a crisis sparked by refugees that can be deemed in 
small quantity compared to the number of refugees we currently host” (Erdoğan, 2016e). 
While delivering an address at the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, President 
Erdoğan slammed the treatment that refugees have been given within the EU by saying that 
“refugees running away from death and tyranny face degrading treatment in European cities” 
(Erdoğan, 2016f). A major emphasis in his criticism towards the EU, however, is still put on 
the closed-doors policy. In October 2016 Erdoğan said that “European countries in particular 
have failed this test of humanity. European countries that have closed off their borders to 
refugees and instead of welcoming them have trampled on the very values that they have 
defended to this day.” (Erdoğan, 2016g). In comparison, he argued during a joint press 
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conference with the President of Slovenia a few weeks later that “today, Turkey is a country 
that observes EU’s fundamental founding values much more than most of the EU countries 
do” (Erdoğan, 2016h). In December of the same year, after once again claiming that the EU 
does not care about the oppressed and the victims, President Erdoğan further posed a question 
addressed to the EU asking “where are the human rights?” (Erdoğan, 2016i). 
In 2017, President Erdoğan’s statements on the address of the EU’s handling of the refugee 
crisis became increasingly critical with main emphasis on the hypocrisy regarding the values, 
especially human rights and Islamophobia. Throughout the criticism, opposing Turkey’s 
approach to that of the EU has remained in focus. For example when talking about the topic 
of human rights in general, Mr. Erdoğan said in April 2017 that “we are embracing and 
upholding democracy, human rights and freedoms not because the European countries want 
so, but because our citizens deserve them. And we are doing this better than they do” 
(Erdoğan, 2017b), indicating that the EU is not keeping up to its own human rights standards 
as good as Turkey, where the EU has been expecting to see more attention on human rights 
protection. Earlier that year he had argued that Turkey cannot accept the EU’s double-
standard policies and inconsistencies against them (Erdoğan, 2017a), referring to the human 
rights expectations and practice.  
At the 72nd UN General Assembly Erdoğan said that “we meet all of the refugee community’s 
needs – including housing, food, clothing, healthcare and education – and provide high living 
standards that earn the appreciation of everyone who visits our country” (Erdoğan, 2017c). 
While pointing out the responsibility that Turkey has taken before the refugees, Erdoğan 
claimed that “by not fulfilling its responsibilities toward refugees, and by failing to keep its 
many promises, the European Union has destroyed its credibility” (Erdoğan, 2017d). In 
November 2017, the President of Turkey further argued that the EU has been turning its back 
to the refugees to save its economic wealth (Erdoğan, 2017e). At an event organized on 
International Migrants Day, Erdoğan criticized several instances related to refugees that had 
happened in the EU, such as closing of the borders, separating children from their parents 
and confiscating their belongings. He also slammed the attitude of some European politicians 
who had suggested to let the migrants drown in the Mediterranean and Aegean (Erdoğan, 
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2017f). Lastly, he referred to an incident that happened on the border of Hungary in 2015 
when a reporter tripped a refugee carrying a child8: “It is high time the Europe which lost its 
human feelings to such an extent that it can trip a father running towards hope holding his 
child in his arms questioned itself.” (Erdoğan, 2017f). By pointing out these examples, Mr. 
Erdoğan was again trying to highlight the contrast between Turkey’s and EU’s approach to 
the refugee crisis. 
In the speeches and statements of 2018, President Erdoğan was strongly criticizing the EU 
for not fulfilling the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 20169 by which the EU was supposed 
to support Turkey in hosting the Syrian refugees with 6 billion euros paid in two parts over 
the next two years (Erdoğan, 2018a). A few weeks later, Erdoğan was addressing the claims 
of the EU that they would only give money for projects, NGOs or UN organizations working 
with refugees, by saying: “European Commission has proposed the second tranche of €3 
billion. […] But first they should transfer the first tranche and make us use it properly. I 
believe we would gain a substantial momentum in a short time if the EU did not waste it’s 
time for pointless things.” (Erdoğan, 2018b). At a press conference before attending an EU-
Turkey Leader’s Meeting later that month, President Erdoğan claimed that “Turkey has 
fulfilled all the requirements of the agreement, and as a result, the humanitarian crisis caused 
by the illegal migration in the Aegean Sea has come to an end” (Erdoğan, 2018c), indicating 
that unlike the EU, Turkey has lived up to its own obligations set in the Joint Statement.  
In 2018, President Erdoğan also directly criticized the treatment of refugees in the EU and 
more specifically, the reception conditions of the EU refugee camps. On World Refugee Day 
in June, the President of Turkey said in his message that “while many Western countries who 
claim to be cradle of democracy and human rights have been hiding behind barbwires, Turkey 
has become a safe harbor for 4 million asylum seekers, more than 3,5 million of which are 
Syrian” (Erdoğan, 2018d). In December the same year, he said that “nothing can be achieved 
 
8 The Guardian. “Hungarian nationalist TV camera operator filmed kicking refugee children.” 8. September 
2015. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/hungarian-nationalist-tv-camera-
operator-filmed-kicking-refugee-children (Last accessed 12.05.2021). 
9 European Council. EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. Available at 




by imprisoning refugees in concentration camps” (Erdoğan, 2018e), suggesting that the 
conditions in the closed EU refugee camps are comparable to concentration camps. He 
further argued that “no one can find a solution to the refugee issue by merely closing their 
borders or confining people, who flee from starvation, draught and conflicts, to barbed wires 
with police measures” (Erdoğan, 2018e), criticizing both the EU closed-doors approach and 
the conditions it has created for refugees who have been allowed entry into the Union.  
In 2019 President Erdoğan continued to argue that the EU Member States among other 
western countries have failed a test of humanity by refusing the refugees on their borders. At 
a G20 Summit in June he highlighted the burden that Turkey and Jordan among only a few 
neighboring countries of Syria have had to carry by themselves while the West has not been 
helping enough: “Developed countries and western states, which lecture other countries on 
human rights, have unfortunately failed in the most fundamental test of humanity” (Erdoğan, 
2019). He further illustrated his point by saying that “little kids will continue to lose their 
lives on riverbanks and seashores unless policies centered on conscience rather than 
prejudices are implemented for refugees” (Erdoğan, 2019). By saying this, Erdoğan referred 
to the situation in EU southern Member States which upon the arrival of refugees had blocked 
their entrance to the country or failed to save them at sea. 
In 2020, President Erdoğan strongly criticized the treatment of refugees in Greece. In March 
2020, he stated that “all countries, including Greece, must comply with their international 
obligations, examine the applications of migrants and refugees that have arrived in their 
borders, regardless of their nationalities, and provide the necessary protection” (Erdoğan, 
2020a). He added that on the same day, Greek police had allegedly killed two refugees on 
the border between Turkey and Greece and suggested that since the President of the European 
Council Charles Michel was supposed to visit the border the following day, he should be able 
to witness the inhumane treatment given to the migrants there (Erdoğan, 2020a). In 
September, the President of Turkey claimed that the attitude of the EU towards refugees 
originates from the colonial times, referring to the economic exploitation over humane 
treatment and added that “it is this crooked mentality which turned the Mediterranean, the 
cradle of civilizations, into a giant grave for refugees” (Erdoğan, 2020b).  
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To conclude, the discourse of President Erdoğan on the address of the EU in relation to its 
response to the refugee crisis throughout 2015 until 2020 was strongly critical. He accused 
the EU of Islamophobia and selfishness for deciding to close its borders to the migrants 
instead of helping them. Additionally, he claimed that the EU has proved to be hypocritical 
when it comes to human rights protection and that it has turned its back to some of the main 
values stated in the treaties. Furthermore, Erdoğan was strongly contrasting the approach of 
the EU to the approach of Turkey, saying that the latter has been welcoming and provided 
the refugees with needed assistance while the EU in addition to closing its borders has been 
mistreating the refugees, refused to help them out at the sea and created camps with poor 
conditions. 
4.1.2. Jordan 
The representation of the EU in the speeches and statements of King Abdullah II of Jordan 
has been very different from those of Erdoğan, mainly just pointing out the burden that Jordan 
is bearing through hosting a large number of refugees and requesting further assistance from 
the EU to manage the crisis. In his speech before the European Parliament in March 2015, 
King Abdullah II said that: 
“Despite scarce resources, the people of Jordan have opened their arms to refugees 
fleeing regional violence. […] [Jordan is] giving shelter to 1.4 million Syrian refugees, 
which is 20 percent of the population. […] This is more than the equivalent of France 
hosting the entire population of Belgium. My country is now the third-largest refugee 
host and I thank all of you who are helping is to uphold this global responsibility.” 
(King Abdullah II, 2015a).  
This statement by the King of Jordan shows that while it is important for Jordan to emphasize 
the effort that it is putting into hosting the refugees and treating them humanely, it does not 
oppose itself to the EU.  
Furthermore, Jordan has shown gratitude for the support that it has received from the EU. 
For example, in November 2015, King Abdullah II thanked the Chancellor of Austria for 
supporting Jordan and its people in managing the large number of refugees (King Abdullah 
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II, 2015b). In December of the, the King of Jordan pointed out that “the increasing pressure 
on its limited resources requires intensifying the international community’s support to the 
Kingdom to enable it to continue providing relief and humanitarian services in this area [of 
hosting refugees].” (King Abdullah II, 2015c). Such statements by the leader of Jordan show 
that while the burden of refugees is challenging for Jordan, it has chosen to not criticize the 
EU openly for lacking solidarity and not living up to its values. 
In 2016 King Abdullah II kept the line with his statements on the refugee crisis and the 
relations between Jordan and the EU in terms of handling the situation. In an interview given 
to CNN in January 2016, he opened up a bit more about the approach that Jordan has taken 
on the refugee influx, stating that Jordan was hosting about 1.2-1.3 million refugees at that 
moment (King Abdullah II, 2016a). The King of Jordan also claimed that there has been 
some pressure by the international community to accept more refugees still waiting on the 
other side of the border:  
“[…] we have been challenged recently because there is 12, 000 or 14, 000 refugees 
across our border on the eastern side that have not been allowed to come in except for 
very strict screening. […] We do have our government, our military and our hospitals 
as well as NGOs on the other side looking after them, but the pressure we get from the 
international community saying ‘look, you have already got 1.2’.” (King Abdullah II, 
2016a).  
The King further noted that based on this, from a humanitarian and moral point of view, the 
determination of Jordan cannot be questioned and added that it is not possible to ignore the 
condition of the refugees who need to be let into the country (King Abdullah II, 2016a). 
While this is not a straightforward criticism towards the approach that the EU has taken, it is 
possible that by mentioning the pressure from the international community on Jordan and 
stating that the refugees need to be taken care of, King Abdullah II was also referring to the 
need for shared responsibility-taking.  
The King of Jordan also addressed the issue of shared responsibility-taking during several 
meetings with EU leaders. For example in March 2016 during his meeting with the High 
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Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini, he stressed the importance of coming up with 
a comprehensive political solution for shouldering Jordan in light of the burdens that it is 
carrying by hosting the Syrian refugees (King Abdullah II, 2016b). He pointed out the same 
later in August while emphasizing that Jordan is hosting the most Syrian refugees in the 
world [in relation to its own population] (King Abdullah II, 2016c). In November, King 
Abdullah II once again stressed the need for support from the EU, especially for providing 
the refugees in Jordan with necessary humanitarian and relief services (King Abdullah II, 
2016d). 
In 2017, the speeches and statements of the King of Jordan did not reveal any changes to the 
perception of the EU nor significantly contributed to the perceptions that have already been 
articulated above. By 2018 the King of Jordan had started to put more emphasis in his 
statements to the refugee crisis being a common responsibility of the international 
community. While not specifically criticizing the EU or other actors for not welcoming as 
many refugees as Jordan, he pointed out the rising need for support in handling the crisis and 
taking care of the refugees. During a trilateral summit with the leaders of Greece and Cyprus 
in January 2018, he stated that “the plight of Syrian refugees remains an international 
concern, and host countries like Jordan need the world’s support. We are shouldering an 
immense refugee burden and cannot be left alone as we undertake this humanitarian 
responsibility on behalf of the world” (King Abdullah II, 2018a). Two months later, King 
Abdullah II said that creative solutions are needed in order to overcome the unemployment 
problem in Jordan that is affecting both the local youth and refugees, so that they would be 
prepared in the future to rebuild their countries (King Abdullah II, 2018b). He further added 
that “this is the heart of Jordan’s world-recognized refugee response plan” (King Abdullah 
II, 2018b), indicating that the international community perceives Jordan’s response to the 
refugee influx well and appreciates it. During the 73rd session of UN General Assembly, King 
Abdullah II opened up about the treatment of refugees in Jordan a little bit more by saying 
that “our people have opened their homes, schools, public services, hospitals. We have shared 




At the same time, in all of his statements before international leaders, he kept emphasizing 
the importance of international support. At a meeting with a delegation of the Parliamentary  
Assembly of Council of Europe, he once again stressed the need for the EU countries to 
shoulder their responsibilities towards the major refugee hosting countries so that they would 
be able to continue providing the necessary humanitarian relief (King Abdullah II, 2018c). 
During his meeting with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in June 2018, the King of 
Jordan thanked Germany for having provided generous assistance to Jordan in hosting the 
refugees (King Abdullah II, 2018d). While thanking Germany for its support, King Abdullah 
II still stressed at the UN General Assembly session that refugee crisis is a global 
responsibility (King Abdullah II, 2018e). He further said that “the sacrifices we and other 
host countries make every day can only continue if donor nations hold up their side of the 
partnership” (King Abdullah II, 2018e). The latter statement also refers to the EU-Jordan 
Compact of 2016, by which the EU takes a responsibility to support Jordan with at least €747 
million to assist in offering various support to the refugees10. 
In 2019, the King of Jordan made a joint statement on the issue with the leaders of Cyprus 
and Greece at their trilateral summit in April. In the joint statement the leaders claimed that 
they appreciate the role of Jordan for hosting over 1.3 million Syrians in their country as well 
as acknowledge the efforts of Cyprus to host a disproportionate number of refugees (King 
Abdullah II, 2019). As for the situation in Greece, the joint statement of the three leaders 
stated the following: “We also underline the crucial role of Greece with regard to the 
reception and accommodation of the refugees and appreciate the humane treatment of the 
refugees in the country.” (King Abdullah II, 2019). While it is a joint statement and not a 
personal declaration of King Abdullah II, it does at least to a certain extent show his 
perception of EU’s response to the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean Member States to be 
positive. 
 
10 European Commission. EU-Jordan Partnership. The Compact. Available at 




During his speech before the European Parliament in January 2020, he pointed out that if the 
response weakens, the most vulnerable people – the refugees – will pay the highest price with 
no future ahead of them (King Abdullah II, 2020). Furthermore, he pointed out the need to 
invest into stabilizing the situation in Syria and the Middle East in general to avoid such 
crises in the future: “Do any of us, in this hall, want to see another Syrian refugee crisis 
unfold, with all its horror and heartbreak? Or another child washed up on your shores? I know 
I speak for everyone when I say, absolutely not.” (King Abdullah II, 2020). This falls in line 
with his previous statements stressing the need for a global responsibility to the crisis.  
Conclusively, the statements of King Abdullah II of Jordan in regard of the EU’s response to 
the migrant crisis have been rather neutral. While he has similarly to President Erdoğan 
pointed out the admirable response that Jordan has given to the influx of refugees, he has not 
contrasted or even compared it to the one of the EU. King Abdullah II has throughout the 
years repeatedly drawn attention to Jordan needing more assistance from the international 
community, especially the EU in handling the refugee crisis. However, he has not specified 
whether this means the expectation of the EU to accept more of the refugees or merely the 
expectation of the EU to fund Jordan to a greater extent than it has. As for the perceptions of 
the EU in regard of its human rights practices, the King of Jordan has not focused on the 
issue in his statements nor commented in any specific manner the treatment of refugees or 
the conditions in the European refugee camps. 
4.2. Civil society perceptions of the EU as a human rights model in the context of the 
treatment of migrants 
This subchapter focuses on the external perceptions of the EU among representatives of 
NGOs in Turkey and Jordan. The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews. As the 
interviewees gave their consent to participate in the interviews anonymously, they are 
indicated in the analysis with letter and number combinations deriving from the first letter of 
their respective countries and the order in which they gave the interviews. These 





Awareness on the treatment of refugees and related human rights practice in the EU 
The awareness of the interviewees on the treatment of refugees within the EU, especially in 
the hotspot reception facilities varies. However, majority of the awareness is regarding the 
camps in Greece which is geographically closer to Turkey and the situation in which has 
been covered in a greater extent by the media. All of the five interviewees claimed that they 
have heard of stories of the refugees being pushed back to Turkey from the border with 
Greece while being treated inhumanely. For example, T1 shared a story of a refugee that they 
had worked with:  
“I can truly talk about cases of ill-treatment by the Greek police, for example one case 
that I had with a refugee from Afghanistan trying to cross to Greece, they took their 
passport and all the documents that they had, of course including their refugee claims 
and as I was informed by the refugee, burned them in front of their eyes so right now 
they have no claim to be a refugee in Turkey or anywhere else based on the 
documents.”  
The interviewee also pointed out a recent situation where some refugees who had been 
handcuffed by the Greek police had been left to the sea, claiming that the situation had also 
been documented through photo footage: “Two weeks ago six refugees were found wearing 
handcuffs on their back, they had thrown them to the sea. They were unable two swim of 
course, four bodies were found and two of them lived. There were so many photos of it.”. 
As for the conditions in the hotspot camps, the interviewees had heard of the poor hygiene 
conditions, overcrowding, lack of sanitation, torture, unreasoned detention, lack of medical 
support and access to clean water. T3 shared their insights about the hotspots in both of the 
countries since they had personal experience working in the field in Italy a few years back: 
“Now in the collective camps [in Italy] I know that there are mainly hygiene issues and even 
with the supply of decent food. Also it is very overcrowded in the camps in Sicily and in 
Greece…I don’t know where to start about Greece because they are horrible…they host five 
times more than the camps are structured to, you know?”. In addition to pointing out the 
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severe overcrowding, T4 drew attention to additional problems regarding various assistance: 
“There’s lack of everything, there’s lack of space to live […] They don’t have access to 
washing water, clean water, they also don’t have any access to medical support there.”.  
As for specific human rights violations, the interviewed NGO representatives from Turkey 
mentioned unexplained detentions, keeping the refugees from applying for asylum and the 
violation of everyone’s  right to live in dignity and not to be tortured. The conclusive 
perceptions of the human rights conditions in the EU hotspot camps were strongly negative 
for all of the interviewees from Turkey. T3 claimed that they believe that all of the basic 
rights are being violated in the Greek camps while T4 stated that “I’ve heard such horrific 
stories that I don’t even want to talk about them because I just get so upset when I think about 
those things.”. T5 was referring to a conversation with a friend who had been wondering why 
the refugees want to move on to Greece at all: “He [interviewee’s friend] was witnessing 
hard conditions for the refugees in the Greek camps where he works. […] So he was asking 
me ‘do you know why the refugees from Turkey are trying to go to the EU because the 
conditions there in the camps are very bad’.”. Similarly, T1 stated that in their opinion it is 
better for the refugees to not make it into the camps in Greece at all. 
EU as a normative model on human rights and related perceptions 
When it comes to the awareness on EU human rights agenda and laws, majority of the 
interviewees admitted that they lack specific information. However, T2 for example claimed 
that as far as they know, the human rights situation in general is better in the western Member 
States than in the eastern ones. T1 said that the EU only has limited competence in monitoring 
the human rights violations and would have to work more on it within specific Member 
States. However, T4 was being more critical, pointing out hypocrisy of the EU when it comes 
to human rights issues: “On paper they have good laws, but you know…in practice they are 
not being followed. Having a law that is not being followed makes no sense.”.  
When talking of human rights in general, the interviewees agreed that Turkey should take 
the EU as a model to follow, pointing out certain weaknesses that Turkey has in this regard. 
As an answer to the question of whether Turkey should take the EU as a model to follow 
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when it comes to human rights protection, T1 said: “Human rights in general, indeed, they 
do, yes! We cannot talk about rule of law or freedom of speech in Turkey, it’s clear.”. T3 
also pointed out the freedom of speech and the right to protesting or sharing certain content 
on social media which is not always protected in Turkey. Additionally, T5 suggested that 
there is more transparency in regard of human rights violations in the EU than there is in 
Turkey: “At this point yes, I would support that Turkey would have a similar approach as the 
European Union. […] From my point of view, in the EU there is this freedom and visibility 
of human rights violations […] here, we try to hide these violations.”. 
Yet, when it comes to seeing the EU as a human rights protector in the world, the perceptions 
of the interviewees from Turkey varied. For instance T2 did not see the EU as a human rights 
protector because they claimed that the behavior of the EU is depending on specific 
circumstances and is thus hypocritical. They argued that in order to be a protector if human 
rights, one should always protect everyone and not only choose certain contexts or situations 
for that. T4 had a similar opinion on the issue: “You can say all you like, but on the ground 
the reality is very different. So, absolutely no! I don’t agree at all.”. At the same time, T1, T3 
and T5 said that in general terms they do perceive the EU as a human rights protector in the 
world despite them not being ideal. T3 explained it in a following way: “When it comes to 
migration, I don’t believe so. […] But in general, yes…because who is it then if not the EU? 
[…] It could be much better of course…there could be less hypocrisy. […] It should be 
improved.”. A comparison with the rest of the world was also drawn by T5: “If we compare 
to the rest of the world, yes – they are the ones. If I am going to call one region that, it would 
be the EU. […] But this does not mean that they are presenting the most ideal situation.”. 
These answers showed that even though the EU is not considered to be a perfect example on 
human rights protection, it is still considered to be better than the rest of the world. 
EU as a normative model on migration and related perceptions 
As for the perceptions of the EU in handling the migration crisis, the interviewees admitted 
that in their opinion, the EU has to a large extent failed in standing for its own values and 
human rights regulations. T3 for example said: “They definitely failed to protect…I don’t 
want to be all negative, there are definitely good examples within the EU, but I also think 
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that many more things could have been done.”. T4 was more critical, drawing attention to 
the hypocrisy within the EU-Turkey migrant deal of 2016:  
“They have completely failed. EU has not done a good job in this crisis at all. They 
have separate laws for separate populations. […] Like the EU-Turkey deal for 
example…what is that? [Imitating the EU]: ‘here, take some money and keep these 
people with you’. It is not really a humanitarian deal that they made.”.  
At the same time, several representatives of the NGOs also pointed out good examples of 
handling the crisis in certain Member States of the EU. T4 said: “If you take separate 
countries like for example Germany, Sweden…they have done good things for the refugee 
population.”. T5 also positively pointed out Germany among other Member States, but 
nevertheless argued that even there the situation is not ideal:  
“To my understanding, somehow they are managing much better than Turkey. […] I 
was having a talk with a colleague from Germany, so I got to hear about the integration 
policies in Germany…compared to Turkey, I think that they manage better, but that 
does not mean that they manage very well.”.  
Similarly, T1 brought Germany as a good example although pointed out its certain 
hypocritical behaviors:  
“When I was in Germany I kind of liked their approach because they were offering 
many benefits to the refugees there.[…] but the funny part is, they were already highly 
qualified. I think that Germany is selecting the refugees. […]  maybe I can call that 
hypocrisy because they are taking in people who bring some advantage to them. Turkey 
does not have this choice.” 
The interviewees claimed that the response of the EU to the migration crisis has changed 
their general perception of the EU, especially in regard of its reputation as a human rights 
protector. T3 for example said: “I used to be a stronger advocate for the EU to be a human 
rights protector before. […] There is this human rights arrogance in a way, where some rights 
are only for the European citizens but not for non-Europeans. […] My perception has 
definitely changed.”. The interviewees specifically pointed out that they were expecting the 
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EU to accept more refugees than they did. In that regard, T1 said: “I expected the EU to 
accept all the people coming from the war, but they select people. It shows the hypocritical 
face of them.”. T4 emphasized their disappointment with the agreement between the EU and 
Turkey:  
“Yeah, in 2015 we had very many hopes that this issue would be handled better […] I 
remember we had a lot of people from the EU Parliament come to visit to check the 
ground situation […] they came, they saw and what did they do? They made a deal 
with Turkey like [imitating the EU]: ‘we don’t want these people actually so let us sign 
a deal, we give you this much money and you keep them’. So that was very 
disappointing […] In the beginning we did not think that Europe would do that.”.  
Additionally, they suggested that in cases where the EU did take refugees in, they should 
have treated them better. 
When it comes to the question of whether the EU is seen as a model to follow on migration 
and the protection of refugees, the general opinion was that Turkey has in fact been handling 
the situation better, especially in the treatment of refugees. T2 for example pointed out that 
while the EU has decided to close its borders, Turkey has been welcoming and instead of 
keeping the refugees in camps, managed to integrate them in the society. Additionally, T4 
argued that the conditions in the refugee camps in Turkey are significantly better and more 
advanced than in the EU: “[The camps in Turkey] are much-much better equipped than the 
ones in Greece.[…] The tents are there, electricity is provided, there’s schools, there’s little 
shops for groceries, there’s medical care. It’s not like a dump.”. T1 claimed that: “Turkey is 
handling so many refugees and its doing it better than the EU.”, while T3 suggested that the 
EU itself should take some good examples from Turkey – especially the decision to not 
securitize migration policies by closing the borders. Similarly to the others, T5 argued that it 
is better for the refugees in Turkey since the conditions in the EU refugee camps are bad and 
the Union is providing good opportunities only for highly qualified refugees. 
To conclude, the awareness of the NGO representatives working with refugees in Turkey 
regarding the treatment of refugees and the related human rights practices within the EU was 
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sufficient enough to know of the conditions and specific human rights violations that have 
also been discussed in the first part of the analysis based on the FRA reports from the EU 
hotspots. While the EU was perceived as a human rights protector and a desirable normative 
model on human rights in general, the interviewees admitted that the poor treatment of 
refugees has undoubtedly thrown shade on such reputation and that the perceptions have 
turned more negative since 2015. As for the EU being a normative model to follow on 
migration, the interviewees argued that the EU had not been living up to its own standards in 
this regard, thus making it impossible to see it as a desirable model in the field and suggested 
that if anything, Turkey should be a model on migration and treatment of refugees for the EU 
to follow, not the other way around. 
4.2.2. Jordan 
Awareness on the treatment of refugees and related human rights practice in the EU 
Similarly to the interviewees from Turkey, the NGO representatives from Jordan had mainly 
heard about the treatment of refugees in Greece and little or not at all about the situation in 
Italy. Three of the four interviewees claimed that they know of very hard conditions in the 
European refugee camps. J1 specifically pointed out the lack of equipment and necessary 
supplies in the camps, but also emphasized the vulnerable situation of refugee women: 
“Refugee camps in the EU are not really equipped let’s say to have that huge number of 
refugees. […] Even lack of water supplies, lack of food, everything is limited, and women 
are at most risk of violence – sexual violence as well.”. J3 shared a specific story of sexual 
violence that had recently taken place in one of the camps in Greece and also referred to the 
mental hardship of children that are staying in the camps: “A few days ago I heard a story 
about a woman who fled from Afghanistan to that camp [in Greece], and she got raped on 
the first day that she arrived. And about children – that they are thinking about committing a 
suicide. […] There’s also no privacy, no doors.”. J4 had heard about the fire in Moria camp 
in Greece in September 2020 and about complaints regarding poor conditions: “I’ve heard a 
lot about the conditions and as far as I know, they are not the best. […] I heard many 
complaints about the inhumane situation.”.  
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Differently from the others, J2 admitted that they do not have a lot of awareness on the 
situation in the EU refugee camps and claimed that they know more about the situation in the 
Middle East, thus assuming that the conditions in the EU camps are good:  
“I think the camps in Europe are in good conditions…of course I never went there to 
actually know the situation but compared to other countries I think it is good. I think 
they have food, they have electricity […] but I have no idea about their food security, 
about their human rights situation. I know more about the situation in the Middle East, 
especially in Jordan.”. 
 They also pointed out that they have heard of Syrian refugees in Germany since it has 
accepted a large volume of them and claimed that to their knowledge, Germany has been 
treating the refugees very well. 
As for the specific human rights violations, three of the interviewees admitted that they do 
not have detailed information on human rights violations against the refugees within the EU 
refugee camps. However, J3 mentioned violations against the right to non-discrimination, the 
rights of LGBTI people in the camps, the right against torture and the rights of the child. 
They also pointed out the problems with sanitation and clean water which are related to the 
overcrowding. As for the rest of the interviewees, they mentioned general inhumane living 
conditions which are not allowing the refugees to live in dignity. 
EU as a normative model on human rights and related perceptions 
When it comes to the awareness of the EU human rights laws and agenda, the interviewees 
had heard about the main values of the Union in general. For example J4 said: “I know that 
the EU is based on their values – democracy, rule of law, human rights and they have their 
own EU human rights constitutions and their own council to comply with these laws and 
regulations.”. J3 said that based on the slogans that the EU puts out on their delegation’s 
building in Jordan, they are strongly advocating for the rights of women and children: “I 
always see the slogans that they put here [on the EU building in Amman] for women’s 
protection and child protection mostly…these are the two things that I always see.”. J2 
admitted that while they do not know a lot, they have an idea that the human rights situation 
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in western Europe is better than it is in eastern Europe: “Comparing for example the Eastern 
Europe to Western Europe, yes, Western Europe take care of human rights of course more 
than Western Europe. There’s more freedom of speech.”. 
The perception of whether Jordan should take the EU as a model to follow when it comes to 
human rights practice and protection in general, varied among the interviewees. J1 claimed 
that perhaps Jordan should take the EU as an example only in certain cases while J2 believed 
that Jordan should follow the human rights principles promoted by the EU. At the same time, 
J2 also pointed out that Jordan has actually already signed several human rights treaties and 
declarations, indicating that the general human rights situation in Jordan is not bad. As a 
specific example, they referred to transparency in regard of human rights violations within 
the EU, saying that: “[…] there are [in the EU] a lot of human rights activists…you know, a 
lot of people who can criticize if there is something bad happening […] like remember when 
in Hungary a journalist tried to hit a refugee…how the video went viral, and people started 
talking about it.”. On the other hand, J3 argued that in their opinion the EU should not be 
considered to be a good example for Jordan because of its own shortcomings in terms of 
human rights protection: “When you want to choose someone as a role model or you want to 
follow them, they need to be perfect 100%.”. Lastly, J4 claimed that Jordan is doing well in 
regard of human rights protection and argued that Jordan itself can actually be considered as 
a good example: “I don’t think that Jordan needs to take the EU as a model because Jordan 
itself can be considered a model, in the Middle East in particular.”. 
When it comes to the perception of the EU as a human rights protector in the world, none of 
the interviewees from Jordan fully agreed to this image. J1 was the most critical in this regard, 
claiming that: “They [the EU] are just saying: ‘we are, we are, we are…’, but in practice they 
are not doing that much.”, arguing that the Union is not living up to its self-claimed standards 
and values. A similar perception was shared by J4 who said: “I think that the EU is actually 
trying to pursue its own interest. […] They try to build their relations with the other countries, 
including Jordan, based on these values, but you cannot actually see this on the ground.”. 
When thinking about the reputation of the EU as a human rights protector in relation to the 
refugee crisis, J2 pointed out that:  
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“To be a protector of the human rights, I think they don’t only have to deal with the 
symptoms of the disease when we talk about the refugees but also To prevent this crisis 
in the beginning? If they really take the human rights seriously…half a million people 
have been killed in Syria…by their president.”.  
Yet, J2 admitted that they agree to the EU being a protector of human rights in comparison 
to other countries who do even less in that regard. Similarly, J3 argued that while the EU has 
done certain things to be a protector of human rights in the world, it has not done enough. 
EU as a normative model on migration and related perceptions 
As for the perceptions related to migration and the treatment of refugees, the interviewees 
from Jordan suggested that the EU has not taken good enough care of the refugees and that 
the approach taken does not comply with the EU’s own values and standards. In this regard, 
J1 said:  
“The EU is trying to be the model for other countries so by doing this, you really need 
to show the world that you are doing really well with managing this crisis, right? But 
in fact…they are not […] The EU is interested in the [EU-Jordan] Compact because 
they think that by giving Jordan money and assistance, refugees will find living there 
instead of leaving Jordan and coming to Europe.”.  
J4 also pointed out that while the EU laws would suggest a very good care and treatment for 
the refugees in Europe, the practice seems to have fallen behind: “In practice, the laws and 
the reality are not parallel. We cannot always see their laws in the practical aspects.”. J3 
argued that the EU has succeeded to live up to its own standards in the protection of the 
refugees only partly: “I can’t say that they have failed, and I can’t say that they have lived up 
to their standards. They are always missing something, they are not doing it 100%, maybe 
like 50 or 60, but they are not fulfilling their role.” J3 was also indicating that often the 
response is only temporary and does not in the end provide sufficient help for the refugees in 
long term.  
Similarly to the case of Turkey, all the interviewees from Jordan claimed that their perception 
of the EU had changed throughout the migration crisis since 2015. They explained that they 
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had expected a more sophisticated response and a more welcoming stance form the EU based 
on the perception that they had of the organization before the crisis. J2 emphasized that they 
had an expectation to the EU to take more responsibility in handling the crisis:  
“As an Arab for example or someone from the Middle East – we see the EU as a symbol 
for freedom, for human rights. […] we expected more from the EU. […] We can’t deny 
the fact that they have supported the refugees with millions of dollars […] but we 
expected more, especially from the biggest countries, these countries which are 
wealthy, have good resources and management, freedom of speech, they have 
everything – I think they can accept more refugees. […] There is something that we 
call sharing responsibility.”.  
The same change of image was described by J4:  
“The EU has always claimed to be the protector of human rights and rule of law and 
the equality of all the people. But the way that the refugees were treated, the way that 
they closed the borders in front of them, the ways in which many refugees were dying 
while trying to reach Europe […] tells you that the EU, this huge institution built on 
these values, once it was under crisis, all the principles were trampled.”.  
The other interviewees also mentioned expecting better equipped facilities for the refugees 
who were allowed into the EU to seek asylum.  
When it comes to the question of whether Jordan should take the EU as an example on 
migration and the treatment of refugees, two of the interviewees did not have a strong opinion 
while the other two suggested that Jordan has handled the crisis very well in their opinion 
and pointed out certain things that the EU itself should learn from Jordan in this regard. J2 
explained it with the long-time experience that Jordan has in the field of receiving refugees: 
“I think EU can take Jordan as an example. Not because I am Jordanian, but because we have 
a lot of experience with refugees actually, for more than 70 years and the number of refugees 
that we have…you know, more than 30% of the Jordanian people are actually refugees.”. 
More specifically, J2 argued that the EU should find a better balance between securitization 
and humanitarian aspects:  
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“Maybe if we talk about the human rights, yeah, the EU takes care of human rights 
more in this respect than Jordan, but also the number of refugees in many countries is 
very-very low compared to Jordan. […] But they can take it [Jordan] as an example on 
how to find a balance between security and human rights…which is not an easy task if 
we are talking about a million refugees – to take care of the refugees and respect the 
international laws.”.  
J1 claimed that even the conditions in the Jordanian refugee camps are better and pointed out 
that considering the available assets of the EU, the latter should have done more in this 
regard:  
“In the camps, Jordan is trying to provide the best that it can and even if it is not perfect, 
it is still better than in the other countries in the EU. Because for instance if you are 
looking at what is happening in Italy and Greece – they have got the money and they 
have got the support already from the EU. So what makes you treat the refugees this 
way? Why can’t you just provide them with the assistance they need and the healthcare 
they need and all that?”. 
In conclusion, the awareness of the interviewed NGO representatives from Jordan on the 
human rights practice from the hotspot refugee camps and the treatment of refugees in the 
EU in general was good enough to be aware of majority of the problems that had been pointed 
out also by FRA on the visits to the hotspots in 2016 and 2019. The interviewees were also 
well aware of the EU human rights agenda and related values in general. As for seeing the 
EU as a normative model on human rights, the interviewees tended to admit that they would 
not consider the EU to be a desirable model to follow considering that often its actions do 
not comply with its own rhetoric, thus making it complicated to perceive as a good example 
in the field. Additionally, they claimed that their previously positive perception of the EU as 
a human rights protector had suffered after witnessing the response to the migration crisis. In 
terms of being a normative model on migration and the treatment of refugees, the 
interviewees from Jordan argued that Jordan itself would be a better example in this regard, 
especially in light of its long-term experience in the field. However, they also pointed out 
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that the conditions created for the refugees in Jordan are in comparison significantly better 
than the ones created for the refugees and other migrants within the EU.  
4.3. Discussion 
The analysis of the political leader’s statements and the interviews with civil society 
representatives have shown that in case of Turkey, the discourses on the external perceptions 
of the EU as a normative actor on human rights protection are consistently negative in relation 
to the treatment of refugees. President Erdoğan has strongly criticized the EU when it comes 
to the treatment of refugees, claiming that the response taken by the EU does not match the 
rhetoric of the EU on human rights protection. This perception is also shared by the people 
who themselves are working with refugees in Turkey and are aware of the poor human rights 
conditions for the refugees that have made it to the EU. It has been argued both by President 
Erdoğan and the civil society representatives that the treatment of refugees in Turkey is 
significantly better than the treatment of refugees in the EU, especially in the hotspot camps 
in Greece, but also in Italy. In that sense, it is clear both from the analysis of Erdoğan’s 
speeches and the interviews with the civil society that Turkey does not perceive the EU as a 
normative model to follow when it comes to migration and the treatment of refugees, as it 
believes that it is already performing significantly better in that sense.  
However, when it comes to the perception of EU as a normative model on human rights, the 
findings from Erdoğan’s discourse and the discourse of the civil society differ. Erdoğan has 
been strictly negative in his statements about the EU in terms of its human rights practices, 
calling it hypocritical and arguing that it has turned its back to human rights as such. The 
perception of the civil society is not as harsh, drawing attention to the fact that despite the 
poor human rights practice regarding the refugees, the EU is still viewed as a desirable model 
to follow on human rights because it is standing for rights such as the freedom of speech and 
the rights of women and is more transparent when it comes to certain violations of human 
rights. 
As for the treatment of refugees and the general approach to migration, the shared perception 
of the political elite and the civil society in Turkey is that the EU has not proved to be a good 
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example in this specific field and thus does not deserve to be regarded as a desirable model 
to follow by others, specifically Turkey. Furthermore, the perception in Turkey is that the 
EU has largely failed its own human rights standards in this regard. On the opposite, Turkey’s 
response is considered to be successful and is perceived to be as a positive example for other 
international actors since it has chosen to take a humanitarian stance instead of a 
securitization stance like the EU. Finally, it is clear that the perceptions of the EU as a 
prominent normative model on human rights have significantly suffered in light of the 
migration crisis since 2015. This has become evident especially from the interviews with the 
civil society, but also from the rising criticism on the address of the EU by President Erdoğan. 
However, it should not be disregarded that the intervening factor of general political relations 
has a greater impact on the perceptions of President Erdoğan than on the perceptions of the 
civil society since many of his critical statements on the address of the EU as a human rights 
actor are given in a context of general criticism towards the Union. 
When it comes to the external perceptions of the EU in Jordan, the visible gap between the 
perceptions of the political elite and the civil society is more grave. King Abdullah II of 
Jordan has not expressed strong opinions on his impressions of the EU as a human rights 
actor or commented on the response of the EU to the migration crisis and the treatment of 
refugees. His statements regarding the crisis are strongly focused on Jordan needing 
assistance from the international community, including the EU. It is possible that King 
Abdullah II has knowingly avoided expressing critical opinions on the address of the EU 
regarding the topic in order to secure good relations with the Union and not to risk the 
financial support of the EU to Jordan. This is likely considering that the King of Jordan has 
kept a neutral stance towards the EU in his statements and has also not made positive remarks 
on the treatment of refugees within the EU.  
However, the civil society in Jordan shares the negative perceptions of the EU as an actor on 
migration and the treatment of refugees. Similarly to the perceptions in Turkey, the 
perceptions in Jordan illustrate the EU as being hypocritical when it comes to the protection 
of the human rights of refugees. As for the general perceptions of the EU as a normative 
model on human rights, the civil society in Jordan sees the EU more negatively that the civil 
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society in Turkey. While the NGO representatives from Turkey were still seeing the EU as a 
desirable model to follow in terms of human rights protection, the representatives from 
Jordan believed that the latter is already a good enough example on by itself. Additionally, 
the interviews with the civil society showed that the perceived hypocrisy in terms of human 
rights and insufficient assistance for the refugees have made it difficult to see the EU as a 
normative example on human rights in general. Lastly, similarly to the findings from Turkey, 
the findings from Jordan suggested that the positive perceptions of the EU as a model on 





This thesis aimed to answer the research question: how does the consistency between EU 
human rights rhetoric and practice in the treatment of migrants affect the external perceptions 
of the EU as a normative model on human rights and migration? In search of an answer to 
the research question, the study posed the following hypothesis: Inconsistency between the 
EU human rights rhetoric and practice in the treatment of migrants and refugees negatively 
affects the external perceptions of the EU as a model on human rights protection and 
migration. To test this hypothesis, the research conducted a comparative study focusing on 
Turkey and Jordan, which are both major refugee hosting states on the Eastern Mediterranean 
migratory route towards the EU.  
The thesis consisted of three main sections. The theoretical framework section explained the 
concept of normative power and introduced the phenomenon of Normative Power Europe as 
well as discussed the EU External Perceptions Literature. The second section of the thesis 
presented the methodology of the research. The methodology section explained the 
methodological framework used for the research, introduced the sources used for the data 
collection and discussed the case selection and research variables. The third section was the 
empirical section consisting of the analysis of the research findings. This section entailed the 
analysis of the consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and practice and the analysis 
of the data on the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan. 
The consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and practice was assessed based on the 
match between the treatment of refugees and other migrants in the hotspot first reception 
facilities in Italy and Greece between 2015 and 2020 and the EU human rights commitments 
enshrined to the normative basis of the EU. The EU human rights rhetoric has been deeply 
embedded into the treaties of the Union alongside with the emphasis on democratic 
governance and solidarity. As part of its normative basis, the EU has committed itself to 
safeguarding human rights, both domestically and in its external relations, including in its 
treatment of migrants. These commitments, as they can be found in the treaties as well as in 
subsequent Council directives and regulations, form the EU’s human rights rhetoric. 
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The analysis showed that there were serious inconsistencies between the EU human rights 
rhetoric and practice when it comes to the operation of the hotspots. The human rights gaps 
persisted both within the procedural work of the hotspots and in the physical conditions of 
the hotspot facilities, especially the camps hosting the asylum seekers who were waiting for 
a decision on their asylum application. Majority of the human rights gaps that had been 
outlined by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights concerned poor living 
conditions, tensions between the persons staying in the hotspots and unsafe conditions 
particularly for children and women which were related to the severe overcrowding in the 
hotspot facilities. The overcrowding in return is a problem largely caused by the slow and 
unclear asylum application processes by the EU agencies in the hotspots. Furthermore, it was 
found that there are also problems with exercising the right to apply for asylum, especially 
in terms of accessing necessary information in that regard. The thesis argues that the EU has 
not been living up to its own human rights standards and values when it comes to the hotspot 
approach, thus confirming inconsistency between the EU human rights rhetoric and practice. 
In order to identify the effect of this inconsistency on external perceptions of the EU, the 
empirical part of the study analyzed external perceptions from Turkey and Jordan between 
2015 and 2020. The two countries were compared to control for possible intervening factors 
on the perceptions, such as the state of general political relations, EU funding for human 
rights promotion and EU funding for refugee aid. Moreover, for both countries, political elite 
perceptions and civil society perceptions were studied in order to increase the reliability of 
findings. As for the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan, the thesis found 
that the perceptions of the EU as a model on human rights have significantly suffered since 
2015 in light of EU’s response to the migration crisis. The main reason for these negative 
perceptions is that the EU has preferred to treat the migration crisis as a security threat rather 
than a humanitarian crisis and decided to close its borders, thus offering assistance to 
significantly fewer refugees than had been expected. However, the research showed that the 
previously good image of the EU as a model on human rights has also suffered because of 
the poor treatment of refugees within the EU, especially in the hotspot reception facilities in 
Greece and Italy.  
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When it comes to the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey, the perceptions of the political 
elite, as measured through the content analysis of leaders’ speeches and statements, and the 
civil society, as measured through the semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives, 
were to a large extent similar. The perception by President Erdoğan of the EU in relation to 
its response to the refugee crisis throughout 2015 until 2020 was strongly negative. He 
perceived the EU to be Islamophobic and selfish for deciding to close its borders to the 
migrants instead of helping them. Additionally, he perceived the EU to be hypocritical when 
it comes to human rights protection and claimed that it has turned its back to some of the 
main values stated in the treaties. Furthermore, Erdoğan was strongly contrasting the 
approach of the EU to the approach of Turkey, saying that the latter has been welcoming and 
provided the refugees with needed assistance while the EU in addition to closing its borders 
has been mistreating the refugees, refused to help them at the sea and created camps with 
poor conditions. Thus, the thesis showed that in the political elite perceptions of Turkey, the 
EU is not perceived as a human rights model or a model on migration. 
As for the civil society in Turkey, the awareness of the NGO representatives working with 
refugees in Turkey regarding the treatment of refugees and the related human rights practices 
within the EU was good enough to know of the conditions and specific human rights 
violations that have been identified also by the FRA in the EU hotspots. While the EU was 
perceived as a human rights protector and a desirable normative model on human rights in 
general, the interviewees admitted that the poor treatment of refugees has definitely 
undermined such reputation and that the perceptions have turned negative since 2015. As for 
the EU being a normative model to follow on migration, the interviewees from Turkey argued 
that the EU had not been living up to its own standards in this regard, thus making it 
impossible to perceive it as a desirable model in the field and suggested that if anything, 
Turkey should be a model on migration and treatment of refugees for the EU to follow, not 
the other way around. Thus, the thesis showed that while the EU is still perceived as a human 
rights model, it is not perceived as a model on migration by the civil society in Turkey. 
In the case of Jordan, the difference between the perceptions of the political elite and civil 
society were more grave. The statements of King Abdullah II of Jordan in regard to the EU’s 
87 
 
response to the migrant crisis have been neutral. While he has similarly to President Erdoğan 
pointed out the admirable response that Jordan has given to the influx of refugees, he has not 
contrasted or even compared it to the one of the EU. The research showed that King Abdullah 
II has throughout the years repeatedly drawn attention to Jordan needing more assistance 
from the international community, especially the EU in handling the refugee crisis. However, 
it became evident that he has not specified whether this means the expectation of the EU to 
accept more of the refugees or merely the expectation of the EU to fund Jordan to a greater 
extent than it has. As for the perceptions of the EU in regard of its human rights practices, 
the King of Jordan has not focused on the issue in his statements nor commented in any 
specific manner the treatment of refugees or the conditions in the European refugee camps. 
This means that the political elite perceptions in Jordan are neither positive of negative in 
light of the migration crisis, but rather neutral. 
The external perceptions of the EU among the civil society in Jordan on the other hand were 
strongly negative. Firstly, the awareness of the interviewed NGO representatives from Jordan 
on the human rights practice from the hotspot refugee camps and the treatment of refugees 
in the EU in general was good enough to be aware of majority of the problems that had been 
pointed out by FRA. The study showed that the interviewees from NGOs do not perceive the 
EU as a desirable model to follow on human rights considering that often its actions do not 
comply with its own rhetoric, thus making it complicated to perceive as a good example in 
the field. Additionally, they claimed that their previously positive perception of the EU as a 
human rights protector had strongly suffered after witnessing the response to the migration 
crisis. In terms of being a normative model on migration and the treatment of refugees, the 
interviewees from Jordan argued that Jordan itself would be a better example in this regard, 
especially in light of its long-term experience in the field. However, they also pointed out 
that the conditions created for the refugees in Jordan are in comparison significantly better 
than the ones created for the refugees and other migrants within the EU. Thus, the thesis 
showed that the civil society perceptions of the EU as a normative model on human rights 
and migration are negative in Jordan.  
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In conclusion, the study found that the consistency between EU human rights rhetoric and 
practice in the treatment of migrants affects the external perceptions of the EU as a normative 
model on human rights and migration. More specifically, it was demonstrated that 
inconsistencies between EU human rights rhetoric and practice in the treatment of migrants 
and refugees reflect in the external perceptions of the EU as a model on human rights 
protection and migration. Thus, the hypothesis put forward in the beginning of the study was 
confirmed based on the collected data, meaning that inconsistency results in negative 
perceptions. Negative perceptions of the EU as a human rights model as could be observed 
in Turkey are not reducible to bad political relations or lower funding on EU refugee aid but 
could also be observed in civil society perceptions in Jordan. The outlier was the political 
elite perception from Jordan, which might be related to Jordan’s general dependency on EU 
foreign aid. 
The main reason behind conducting this research was to fill a gap between the EU External 
Perceptions Literature and Normative Power Europe literature by investigating the role that 
external perceptions play in the existence of normative power. Additionally, this research 
provided an insight to the external perceptions of the EU in two Middle-Eastern countries – 
a region that has not been sufficiently studied in this manner so far. The study followed the 
suggestion of the external perceptions scholars who have advised for the future studies to 
focus on issue and region specificity and the suggestion of the International Relations’ 
scholars who have recommended to pay more attention to the link between normative power 
and external perceptions. This study has demonstrated that there is a strong link between 
external perceptions and normative power in a sense that negative external perceptions lead 
to the decline of being perceived as a normative model by the others. 
While the study reached its objective of testing and proving the link between external 
perceptions as a source for normative power, there were certain limitations to it. First, the 
study was able to test the external perceptions of the EU in Turkey and Jordan only among 
the political elite and the civil society, but not in the media which is the third major source 
for studying external relations. The inclusion of the perceptions of political elite and civil 
society raised the reliability of the study in comparison to if only one of these sources were 
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used. Media sources were excluded from the study because of insufficient available data in 
English media channels of Turkey and Jordan. However, further research could also include 
media under the condition of being able to analyze sources in Turkish and Arabic.  
Second, the researcher was able to conduct only a limited amount of interviews due to the 
hardship of finding contacts from Jordan and Turkey through virtual means and the inability 
to do the field research physically in these countries because of the global pandemic situation. 
While the research managed to get sufficient insights from the conducted interviews, it would 
have gained more through conducting further interviews also with representatives from 
human rights organizations in Turkey and Jordan. 
While this study has provided new insights, it has also opened the door for follow-up studies, 
for example on the perceptions in other regions such as in African countries to determine 
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1. What do you know about the treatment of migrants and refugees in the first arrival camps 
(such as in Lampedusa in Italy, Moria camp on Lesvos island in Greece etc.) in the 
European Union? For example, have you heard about the living conditions that they have 
there? What kind of an impression do you have of these camps and the treatment of 
refugees there? 
2. You may have heard some criticism from the media or through human rights/refugee 
agencies about the conditions in these camps. Do you know of any human rights 
violations that have taken place in the EU refugee camps? If you have heard such 
criticism, what has been criticized and what kind of human rights have been claimed to 
be in danger? 
3. How much do you know about the EU human rights agenda and laws? What do you know 
about human rights talk in the EU? 
4. Do you think that the EU has been treating refugees and other migrants in accordance 
with their own human rights laws and values? Do you think that they have failed in 
protecting the human rights of refugees in some cases? 
5. Do you think that Jordan/Turkey should take the EU as a model to follow when it comes 
to human rights protection in general? 
6. Do you think that Jordan/Turkey should take the EU as a model to follow when it comes 
to the protection of refugees and other migrants? 
7. The European Union itself has claimed to be a protector of human rights. Do you agree 
with this? 
8. Has your perception of the EU as a human rights protector changed between 2015-2021? 






Annex 2.  
Consent form 
 
INFORMED AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
 
• I have been told about the topic and purpose of the interview, and how my responses will 
be used. 
• I have been able to ask questions about the interview and they have been answered. 
• I understand that any attributed quotes from the interview will be used and published only 
for academic purposes. 
• I have been guaranteed anonymity when using my quotes in the following academic 
work. 
• I understand that I am not required to answer any of the questions and can withdraw from 
the interview at any time. 
 













List of interviews 
Interviewee (alias) Country/Title Time of the 
interview 
Place of the 
interview 
T1 Turkey/Representative 


















































Annex 3 (continued). 
J4 Jordan/Representative 
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